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Abstract
The need for secure communications is becoming more and more impor-
tant in modern society as wired and wireless connectivity becomes more
ubiquitous. Currently, security is achieved by using well established
encryption techniques in the upper layers that rely on computational
complexity to ensure security. However, processing power is continu-
ally increasing and well-known encryption schemes are more likely to be
cracked. An alternative approach to achieving secure communication is
to exploit the properties of the communication channel. This is known as
physical layer security and is mathematically proven to be secure. Phys-
ical layer security is an active research area, with a significant amount
of literature covering many different aspects. However, one issue that
does not appear to have been investigated in the literature is the effect
on physical layer security when the noise in the communication channel
is impulsive. Impulsive noise adds large spikes to the transmitted signal
for very short durations that can significantly degrade the signal. The
main source of impulsive noise in wireless communications is electromag-
netic interference generated by machinery. Therefore, this project will
investigate the effect of impulsive noise on physical layer security.
To ensure a high level of performance, advanced error-correcting codes
are needed to correct the multiple errors due to this harsh channel. Turbo
and Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes are capacity-approaching
codes commonly used in current wireless communication standards, but
their complexity and latency can be quite high and can be a limiting fac-
tor when required very high data rates. An alternative error-correcting
code is the polar code, which can actually achieve the Shannon capacity
on any symmetric binary input discrete memoryless channel (B-DMC).
Furthermore, the complexity of polar codes is low and this makes them
an attractive error-correcting code for high data rate wireless commu-
nications. In this project, polar codes are combined with physical layer
security and the performance and security of the system is evaluated on
impulsive noise channels for the first time.
This project has three contributions:
• Polar codes designed for impulsive noise channels using density evo-
lution are combined with physical layer security on a wire-tap chan-
nel experiencing impulsive noise.
• The secrecy rate of polar codes is maximised. In the decoding of
polar codes, the frozen bits play an important part. The posi-
tions of the frozen bits has a significant impact on performance and
therefore, the selection of optimal frozen bits is presented to opti-
mise the performance while maintaining secure communications on
impulsive noise wire-tap channels.
• Optimal puncturing patterns are investigated to obtain polar codes
with arbitrary block lengths and can be applied to different modu-
lation schemes, such as binary phase shift keying (BPSK) and M-
ary Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM), that can be rate
compatible with practical communication systems. The punctured
polar codes are combined with physical layer security, allowing the
construction of a variety of different code rates while maintaining
good performance and security on impulsive noise wire-tap chan-
nels.
The results from this work have demonstrated that polar codes are ro-
bust to the effects of impulsive noise channel and can achieve secure
communications. The work also addresses the issue of security on im-
pulsive noise channels and has provided important insight into scenarios
where the main channel between authorised users has varying levels of
impulsiveness compared with the eavesdropper’s channel. One of the
most interesting results from this thesis is the observation that polar
codes combined with physical layer security can achieve good perfor-
mance and security even when the main channel is more impulsive than
the eavesdropper’s channel, which was unexpected. Therefore, this thesis
concludes that the low-complexity polar codes are an excellent candidate
for the error-correcting codes when combined with physical layer security
in more harsh impulsive wireless communication channels.
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The increasing popularity of mobile devices has meant that the security of wireless
communications has never been more important. Secure communications are cur-
rently achieved by encrypting data, a process that takes place in the upper layers of
the communication system. This has proven to be very effective, although not infal-
lible as encryption is built on the assumption that it is computationally too complex
to break and is not mathematically provable to be absolutely secure. Finding the
secret key in order to ensure communication security is becoming easier due to the
improvements in computer processing ability. The number of attacks on wireless
communications is increasing due to the open characteristic of the wireless network.
An alternative approach to achieving secure communications is to exploit the
random nature of the physical layer itself. This is known as physical layer security
and it employs an information theoretic approach that is mathematically provable
to be secure. It also has the advantage of not requiring the users in a communication
system to share keys and employ complicated encryption and decryption methods.
For these reasons, physical layer security is an active research area that presents
many interesting problems to address.
The main focus of this thesis is to optimise the performance of a wireless com-
munication system employing physical layer security, by combining it with power-
ful error-correcting codes (ECC). ECC works by adding redundancy to messages.
Allowing the receiver to detect and correct channel errors. In traditional error-
correction coding, we only desire that authorized receiver receives the message error
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free. This is known as a reliability constraint on the coding problem. Designing
codes for the wiretap channel model must satisfy both reliability constraints and
security constraints. ECC should provide as much structure for the legitimate re-
ceiver to correct errors, while supplying enough confusion to unauthorized receivers
to achieve security. Capacity-approaching codes, such as turbo and low-density
parity-check (LDPC) codes, are commonly employed due to their powerful error
correction and popularity in many communication standards. However, a more re-
cent coding scheme, known as polar codes has gained increasing interest in academia
and industry and has several advantages over turbo and LDPC codes. Polar codes
are the first proven capacity-achieving codes on binary discrete memoryless chan-
nels (B-DMC), but also have much lower encoding and decoding complexity. These
characteristics have made polar codes very popular and they have now been adopted
into the 5G standard. Hence, it is interesting to investigate polar codes in the con-
text of a communication system employing physical layer security. In this work
we assume the channel model is an impulsive noise channel that is generated by a
symmetric alpha-stable (SαS) distribution. We also assume an eavesdropper always
has a Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) equal to or less than the intended recipient.
1.2 Motivation and Challenges
Combining polar codes with physical layer security has been proposed in the litera-
ture, but there are several areas of novelty in this area that do not appear to have
been considered. Previous research has focused on the well-known wiretap channel,
where two legitimate users (Alice and Bob) are communicating with each other, but
there is also a third unauthorised user (Eve) who is attempting to intercept the
communication between Alice and Bob. The noise added at the receivers on the
wiretap channel is always assumed to have a Gaussian distribution, but a scenario
where impulsive noise is present has not been considered. This type of noise has a
non-Gaussian distribution with heavy tails and will result in all users experiencing
large amplitude random pulses that occur for an extremely short duration. There-
fore, this thesis investigates the effect of impulsive noise on a polar-coded physical
layer security system on the wiretap channel. This opens up a number of scenarios,
such as varying the level of impulsiveness at Bob’s and Eve’s receiver and investigat-
ing if security can still be achieved using polar codes. Furthermore, both Bob and
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Eve could experience different levels of impulsiveness, where Bob’s channel could be
more impulsive than Eve’s channel.
This project presents several challenges that must be overcome to achieve the
implementation of polar-coded physical layer security system. First, the design of
polar codes that are optimised for impulsive noise channels must be investigated.
Existing methodologies, such as density evolution (DE), must be modified to use the
statistics of the impulsive channel model and allow the construction of good polar
codes. Second, we must ensure that the designed polar codes can achieve good
performance, but also guarantee security for Alice and Bob, which is a significant
challenge. Finally, the block length of polar codes is limited to be 2n, where n is a
positive integer, and this limits the usability of these codes in practical applications
where arbitrary block lengths are required. Therefore, puncturing methods will be
investigated to shorten polar codes to arbitrary lengths and produce rate-compatible
polar codes.
1.3 Aims and Objectives
The aim of this thesis is to design and evaluate the performance and security of
polar codes in a wireless communication system employing physical layer security
and subject to impulsive noise. Performance will be evaluated by simulating polar
codes and physical layer security on a wiretap channel with impulsive noise modelled
by a symmetric alpha-stable distribution. The bit-error rate (BER) of different polar
codes will be obtained at Bob’s receiver to evaluate performance and security will
be achieved if the BER at Eve’s receiver is as close to 0.5 as possible for all signal-
to-noise ratios. The objectives of the thesis are:
• To design polar codes optimised for impulsive noise channels using density
evolution.
• To investigate the performance and security of polar codes combined with
physical layer security on impulsive noise channels with different levels of im-
pulsiveness.
• To design polar codes that have maximal secrecy codes rates when combined
with physical layer security, so that security is achieved while the redundancy
in the polar codeword is minimised.
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• To design an optimal puncturing method to obtain polar codes with arbitrary
block lengths and can be applied to different modulation schemes, such as
binary phase shift keying (BPSK) and M-ary Quadrature Amplitude Modu-
lation (M-QAM), that can be rate compatible with practical communication
systems.
1.4 Statement of Originality
This thesis comprises novel work focusing on the design of good polar codes that have
excellent performance and security, with different block lengths and code rates. New
polar codes have been designed that are shown to achieve excellent BER performance
at Bob’s receiver for varying levels of impulsiveness, while ensuring that the BER
at Eve’s receiver is high and does not obtain information about Alice and Bob’s
communication. The results from this part of the thesis have been published in
“Construction of Polar Codes Combined with Physical Layer Security on Impulsive
Noise Channels”. However, these polar codes when combined with physical layer
security suffered from low secrecy code rates, so the design of the polar codes was
improved to ensure the secrecy code rates were significantly increased, while still
guaranteeing very good performance and security. The results of this work were
published in “Frozen Bit Selection Scheme for Polar Coding Combined with Physical
Layer Security”. The block lengths of both types of polar codes were limited to 2n, so
a puncturing method was proposed that shortens the block length to any arbitrary
length and can be applied to different modulation schemes. A journal paper is
currently in preparation to present these results.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter two presents a literature survey on research related to physical layer se-
curity, error-correcting codes (LDPC codes, turbo codes and polar codes) combined
with physical layer security and error-correcting codes designed for impulsive noise
channels.
Chapter three provides an extensive theoretical background on polar codes, phys-
ical layer security and impulsive noise modelling, which is prerequisite knowledge
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for the succeeding chapters comprising the novelty of this thesis.
Chapter four describes the design of good polar codes for impulsive noise channels
with symmetric alpha-stable distribution, which are then combined with physical
layer security. The performance and security of the polar-coded system is evaluated
on the wiretap channel with different levels of impulsiveness.
Chapter five addresses the issue of low secrecy code rates due to the combination
of polar codes with physical layer security. New polar coding scheme are designed
with significantly increased secrecy code rates and performance and security and
evaluated on the wiretap channel with different levels of impulsiveness.
Chapter six addresses the issue of limited block lengths by proposing a puncturing
method to produce arbitrary block lengths and the performance and security of these
punctured polar codes are evaluated for BPSK and M-QAM schemes on the wiretap
channel with different levels of impulsiveness.
1.6 Publications Related to the Thesis
1. H. Cao, Z. Mei, M. Johnston, and S. Le Goff, “Construction of Polar Codes
Combined with Physical Layer Security on Impulsive Noise Channels”, in Proc.
IEEE 18th International Conference on Communication Technology (ICCT),
Chongqing, China, 2018.
2. H. Cao, M. Johnston, and S. Le Goff, “Frozen Bit Selection Scheme for Polar
Coding Combined with Physical Layer Security”, in Proc. IEEE 4th Interna-






In this chapter, the literature on physical layer security techniques, error-correction
codes and impulsive noise will be reviewed. First, we give an overview of physical
layer security on wireless communication that is modelled using wiretap channel.
Then Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes, turbo codes and polar codes (con-
ventional and punctured polar codes) are reviewed, with particular focus on their
combination with physical layer security are reviewed. In addition, examples of
common communication systems with impulsive noise are given. Finally, the per-
formance of error-correcting codes in the presence of impulsive noise channel is
presented.
2.2 Physical Layer Security
Physical layer security technology is based on the absolute security model proposed
by Shannon [2] in 1949. In the classic encrypted system proposed by Shannon, the
legitimate users share a key that the eavesdropper cannot obtain, and use this key
to encrypt and decrypt the data. Under the condition that the the eavesdropper’s
receiving sequence is independent of the transmission sequence, the mutual infor-
mation is 0. However this has issues, such as key distribution and computational
complexity. More importantly, all encryption measures are based on the premise that
it is computationally infeasible for eavesdroppers to be decrypted without the knowl-
edge of the secret key, which remains mathematically unproven. A breakthrough in
6
2.3 Coding Schemes Combined with Physical Layer Security
communications security was physical layer security, which achieves secure transmis-
sions without the need of any form of pre-shared secret keys between the legitimate
users. Security can be achieved through the physical layer, by only exploiting the
difference between the channels of intended receivers and those of eavesdroppers.
This is well represented by Wyner’s [3] wiretap channel model, in which there is a
transmitter (Alice) sending confidential information to a legitimate receiver (Bob),
in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). Since then, Wyner’s wiretap channel has
been extended to a variety of channels, such as broadcast channels with confidential
messages [4] proposed by Csiszar and Korner, the Gaussian wiretap channel [5], and
fading wiretap channels [6–8].
2.3 Coding Schemes Combined with Physical Layer
Security
Error correction codes play an extremely important role in building real-world secure
communication systems. The most popular types of error correction codes are LDPC
codes, turbo codes and polar codes, which have all been considered with physical
layer security.
2.3.1 LDPC Coding Scheme Combined with Physical Layer
Security
Robert Gallager proposed LDPC codes in his doctoral thesis in 1960 and then pub-
lished in [9]. However, LDPC codes were overlooked for a long period due to the
computational limitation of hardware and the development of Reed-Solomon (RS)
codes at that time. In 1996, David Mackay rediscovered LDPC codes and showed
they can achieve near Shannon limit performance [10].
With good error correction performance, LDPC codes have been combined with
physical layer security techniques to ensure secure communication. Thangaraj et
al. [11] applied LDPC codes on a binary erasure wiretap channel system, where the
main channel is noiseless, and proved that both reliability and Wyner’s weak secrecy
criterion could be satisfied simultaneously. LDPC codes and multi-level coding for
the information reconciliation phase of a practical secret key agreement protocol
was proposed by Bloch et al. in [12]. For Gaussian wiretap channels, in [13], the
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authors proved that a ’security gap’ was achievable by employing punctured LDPC
codes and showed that their proposed coding scheme can be used in linear time and
can be effectively applied to practical, finite-block length systems. The security gap
was first introduced in [5] and is defined as the quality ratio between Bob’s and
Eve’s channels that is required to achieve a sufficient level of physical layer secu-
rity, while ensuring that Bob reliably receives the transmitted information. Taieb
and Chouinard [14] applied rate compatible Low-density Parity-Check (RC-LDPC)
channel coding with a Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request (HARQ) protocol using a
feedback channel to ensure reliable and secure transmission between Alice and Bob
and by increasing errors to prevent eavesdroppers obtaining information from Alice.
Simulation results showed that by using the proposed RC-LDPC with HARQ secure
coding scheme, secure transmission for the main channel can be achieved even when
the main channel conditions are degraded compared to the wiretap channel.
2.3.2 Turbo Coding Scheme Combined with Physical Layer
Security
Turbo codes invented in 1993 have raised great interest in the coding community
due becoming the first practical codes to approach the channel capacity. In [15],
adaptive secure channel coding based on punctured turbo codes was proposed to
achieve reliability and security by applying the pseudo-random puncturing strategy
to the eligible noisy channel. A secure turbo coding scheme based on random-
puncturing was proposed in [16], with the puncturing pattern which is kept secret
from the eavesdropper high equivocation-rates can achieve.
2.3.3 Polar Coding Scheme Combined with Physical Layer
Security
2.3.3.1 Polar Codes
After more than half a century of unremitting research, a new generation of encoding
and decoding schemes such as turbo codes and LDPC codes achieved a performance
very close to the Shannon limit. However, no matter how close its performance is
to the Shannon limitation, it never achieves it. For example, at present, the best
known LDPC code has a theoretical performance distance of 0.0045 dB when the
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block length is extremely long. Moreover, both turbo codes and LDPC codes have a
certain randomness in construction, due to the interleaver construction of the turbo
code and the design of the LDPC code node distribution, so that it is necessary to
design a coding scheme according to the design parameters. This random configu-
ration makes it difficult to achieve the theoretical optimal performance of the code
with finite code length; on the other hand, the complexity is also quite high when
constructing a finite code length turbo code or LDPC code with better performance
using a searching method.
The concept of channel polarization was first proposed by Erdal Arikan in 2008
at the International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) Conference [17]. In
2009, [18] was published, in which channel polarization was elaborated in more
detail, and a new encoding method named polar code was presented. Polar codes
have a deterministic construction method and are the only known channel coding
method that can be proven to achieve the channel capacity, and also have much
lower encoding and decoding complexity.
When discussing channel polarization, Arikan assumes the binary discrete mem-
oryless channel (B-DMC) W . However, the applicable range of the Bhattacharyya
parameter Z (W ) which is mainly used to measure the reliability of channel, needs to
be calculated when constructing the polar code on the binary erase channel (BEC).
Therefore, this method could only be applied on the BEC. Then a heuristic method
in [19] was proposed by considering other channels as an equivalent BEC with the
same channel capacity. Mori et al. [20] proposed a construction method named
density evolution (DE) which is applicable to all types of B-DMC. Due to the high
complexity of DE, a simplification of the DE algorithm called Gaussian Approxima-
tion (GA) [21] for a Gaussian channel was proposed, where the probability density
function (pdf) of the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) in the DE algorithm can be ap-
proximated by a Gaussian distribution, which can greatly reduce the computational
complexity. Arikan proved polar codes can achieve the symmetric capacity of the
binary-input discrete memoryless channels (B-DMCs) under a successive cancella-
tion (SC) decoder. The SC decoder is a basic decoding algorithm for polar codes,
which can decode bit-by-bit based on a recursive function in the butterfly diagram
with low complexity. However, the finite-length performance of polar codes under
SC is not competitive. Belief propagation (BP) was employed in [19] to evaluate
the performance of polar codes compared with Arikan’s rule and Reed-Muller (RM)
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rule and was shown to have a significant improvement over SC, but its performance
was still worse than the optimal maximum likelihood (ML) decoder. Later, suc-
cessive cancellation list (SCL) [22], [23] decoding and successive cancellation stack
(SCS) [24] decoding were proposed to achieve performance approaching the ML
decoder with an acceptable complexity. Recently, cyclic redundancy check (CRC)
concatenated polar codes with SCL decoding [22] and CRC-aided SCL/SCS (CA-
SCL/SCS) decoders [25] showed polar codes outperforming the previous channel
codes.
Compared with LDPC codes and turbo codes, polar codes have low complexity
encoding and decoding algorithms, and have been proven to be capacity-achieving
codes for the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC), and extended to arbitrary binary-
input discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) [18], [26]. These characteristics have
made polar codes very popular and they have been studied extensively for a com-
munication system employing physical layer security [26–30]. In 2010, Hof and
Shamai [30] considered the use of secrecy polar codes for the binary-input memo-
ryless symmetric and degraded wire-tap channel. This coding scheme was shown
to achieve the secrecy capacity and the entire rate-equivocation region. Meanwhile,
Mahdavifar and Vardy presented the construction from the strong security condition
and weak security condition [31]. The polar coding scheme proposed by Mahdavi-
far and Vardy [31] divided the polarized channels into different parts to transmit
information bits with bit-channels good for Bob but bad for Eve, random bits on
bit-channels good for both Bob and Eve and zeros on the remaining bit-channels.
This method can achieve the secrecy capacity but with a trade-off in secrecy rate. In
this scheme, the polar codeword is split into three parts: information bits, random
bits and frozen bits. The secrecy rate is defined as the message length divided by the
codeword length, but this was very low due to large number of random bits required.
Ideally we would like the secrecy rate to be equal to the code rate of a conventional
polar code. Huiqing et al. [32] improved the secrecy rate by adding artificial noise,
but this still could not increase the secrecy rate to 0.5 or higher. Recently, Liang
et al [33] obtained a secrecy rate equal to 0.5 by using secure polar coding scheme
with aided Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ), in which the frozen bits are obtained
from the feedback of the legitimate receiver, for the wiretap channel system.
In addition, [34–40] focued on the design of secure polar coding schemes to
achieve secrecy, where strong security is studied in [34,36,39,40], key agreement and
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key generation were proposed in [35, 36, 40, 41], and other channel models that are
different from discrete memoryless wiretap channel are considered in [38], [40] and
[42]. Polar coding schemes for fading wiretap channels in multiple-antenna systems
were first studied in [40], and results showed that the proposed scheme can provide
both reliable and secure communication with low encoding and decoding complexity.
A polar coding scheme for fading wiretap channels that achieves both reliability and
security without the knowledge of instantaneous channel state information at the
transmitter is proposed in [43]. Unlike the previous approaches using 1-D polar
coding, a 2-D polar coding over block fading wiretap channels to achieve secrecy
transmission is presented in [44].
2.3.3.2 Punctured Polar Codes
As proved by Ankan [18], polar codes can achieve channel capacity by using a SC
decoder, however there is a constraint that the code length is limited to N = 2n, n =
1, 2, · · · . By adding or deleting information bit channels we can achieve various code
rates, but the code length N is still limited to a power of two, which reduces the
practical application of polar codes. As discussed in [45–47] puncturing is an ef-
fective method to design rate-compatible codes. Hence in order to create arbitrary
code lengths, a method that punctured some coded bits to obtain rate-compatible
punctured polar codes was first proposed in [48]. In that paper, the performance
of random puncturing of polar codes is investigated and puncturing is also used for
polar codes to improve the performance. Indeed, the results achieve good perfor-
mance using the stopping-tree puncturing method with the BP decoding algorithm,
but it is not as optimal as other decoding algorithms, such as SC [18], SCL [22], [23]
and SCS [24] decoders. In [49], a universal coding scheme for rate-compatible punc-
tured polar (RCPP) codes was proposed. According to the CRC concatenated polar
encoder and CRC-aided SCL/SCS (CA-SCL/SCS) decoders, practical RCPP codes
are generated which can satisfy both different block lengths and different code rates
without changing their basic structure. Their simulation results proved the RCPP
codes have the same performance or even better performance than turbo codes of the
same code length on the binary input additive white Gaussian noise (BI-AWGN)
channel. In [1], a novel puncturing scheme for polar codes was provided where
the shortening pattern was given by the last bits of the mother polar code, and it
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showed better performance than conventional punctured polar codes [49], [50]. Nor-
mally there is no a priori information fed to the decoder about the punctured bits
and the initial corresponding log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) are set to zero. In terms
of the conventional polar code, both the encoder and decoder have the same knowl-
edge of the frozen bits. However, in that paper, the authors proposed a method that
obtained the punctured bits only from the frozen bits. In that case their values can
be known to the decoder and the initialized LLRs of the punctured bits are set to
infinity.
Although previous methods can achieve any code length with polar codes, the
complexity is high due to the DE algorithm which is used to find the puncturing
[49] or shortening [1] set. In terms of attractiveness for hardware implementation,
alternative approaches were proposed in [51–54].
As discussed, punctured or shortened polar codes can be designed with arbitrary
code rates without the limitation of the code length being equal to a power of two.
Based on this advantage a physical layer secrecy coding scheme based on punctured
polar codes under Gaussian wiretap channel is proposed in [55], where the punctured
position is calculated by the reliability of the coded-bit. This proposed coding
scheme can reduces the security gap efficiently.
As shown in the literature, polar codes show good performance to achieve both
weak and strong security, as well as reduce the security gap. However, there is still
scope to design secure polar codes for physical layer security systems in the presence
of no-Gaussian noise.
2.4 Error-correcting Codes in the Presence of Im-
pulsive Noise
In conventional communication systems, noise is usually modelled as additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN). Noise that has a non-Gaussian distribution is called im-
pulsive noise and plays an important role in modern communication systems. It
occurs in wireless networks [56], [57], as well as in power line communications, un-
derwater and molecular communication systems, multiple access interference (MAI)
in ultra-wideband systems and electromagnetic interference (EMI) [58–63].
A main characteristic of impulsive noise is the heavier tails of the noise probabil-
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ity density function causing a higher probability of large amplitude noise, which will
severely degrade the communication system. Therefore several statistical-physical
models, such as the Gaussian mixture model (GMM), Middleton Class A model and
symmetric alpha stable (SαS) distributions [63–65], have been proposed to describe
the behavior of impulsive noise.
2.4.1 LDPC Codes in the Presence of Impulsive Noise
Power line communication suffers from impulsive interference. Therefore, LDPC
codes were applied to mitigate the noise. LDPC codes with a sum-product decoder
for additive white class A noise (AWAN) channels was proposed in [66]. In [67], im-
pulsive noise effects on the power line channel (PLC) with quasicyclic Low-density
Parity-check (QC-LDPC) codes as the outer coding scheme was proposed. In ad-
dition, a practical noise model on an orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) power line communications system was investigated. Recently, the class of
SαS distributions was shown to be an accurate model for impulsive noise, thus the
performance of polar codes were investigated in the presence of SαS noise [68–71].
In [68] the theoretical performance of communication channels with SαS noise was
derived. In order to reduce the complexity, the authors investigated a sub-optimal
receiver for the LDPC-coded channels with SαS noise. Then a analysis of the the-
oretical bit error probability (BEP) of M-ary quadrature amplitude modulation on
Rayleigh fading channels modelled by alpha stable distribution was analysed by [69].
LDPC codes with extremely long block lengths are well known for their powerful
error correction, but it is not always applicable in communication systems, thus [70]
analysed the performance of finite length LDPC codes on impulsive noise channels.
Finally, in [71] LDPC codes with different linear combining techniques on Rayleigh
fading channels with SαS impulsive noise were examined.
2.4.2 Turbo Codes in the Presence of Impulsive Noise
Middleton’s class A noise model is frequently utilized for the modeling of impulsive
noise environments, and a turbo decoding algorithm was proposed for an additive
white class A noise (AWAN) channel [72]. As we know, non-binary codes are more
effective in correcting burst errors, thus the coding scheme of non-binary turbo
codes on additive impulsive noise channels was first proposed in [73]. After that,
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the authors [74] applied non-binary turbo codes on OFDM-PLC system which are
modelled by impulsive noise.
2.4.3 Polar Codes in the Presence of Impulsive Noise
Recently, polar codes have been adopted for impulsive noise channels due to them
being the first proven capacity achieving codes for a wide range of channels with low
encoding and decoding complexity. The bit error rate (BER) performance of polar
codes with SC decoding over the impulsive noise channel modeled by Middleton’s
Class A noise was analysed in [75]. Later, to reduce the effect of impulsive noise,
polar codes with different codeword lengths and noise scenarios in OFDM systems
were investigated in [76]. In this paper,simulation results showed that polar codes
achieved better performance on PLC systems than LDPC codes. In addition, the
performance of polar codes constructed by DE on impulsive noise channels for single-
carrier and multi-carrier systems were proposed and evaluated [77]. However, there
seem to be no publications that have examined the performance of polar codes on
impulsive noise channels with SαS distributions. In this thesis, we will focus on the
noise with SαS distribution and investigate polar-coded performance and polar code
combined with physical layer security in the presence of SαS noise.
2.5 Conclusion
In conventional communication systems, noise is normally modeled using a Gaussian
distribution. However, in some scenarios, the system has a non-Gaussian distribu-
tion which contains a significant interference component, such as impulsive noise. In
addition, for the communication security problem, different coding scheme have been
proposed to achieve secrecy capacity, reduce the security gap and increase the se-
crecy code rate at the same time to ensure illegal receivers cannot extract any useful
information. Compared with LDPC codes and turbo codes, polar codes are the first
proven capacity-achieving codes on B-DMCs, and also have much lower encoding
and decoding complexity. To the best of our knowledge, the security performance
of polar codes is only investigated on the BEC, BSC and BI-AWGN channel, but
not impulsive noise channels. Finally, to construct rate-compatible punctured polar
codes, puncturing methods are investigated for Gaussian wiretap channel system in
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the literature. Therefore, based on the literature, we will investigate polar coded





In this chapter, the background theory on symmetric alpha-stable (SαS) noise is
first explained. Second, different types of wiretap channel models which are an
important part of physical layer security are reviewed. Finally, the chapter concludes
with detailed explanations on polar codes, which includes channel polarization, the
construction of polar codes by a heuristic method, GA method and DE method,
and performance of polar codes with SC and SCL decoding on AWGN channel with
different code lengths. These are the essential theoretical background information
for the novel work presented in chapters four, five and six.
3.1 Symmetric Alpha-stable (SαS) Distribution
There are several well known methods for modeling impulsive noise, including the
Gaussian mixture model (GMM), Middleton Class A model and α-stable model. In
this chapter we describe SαS distributions which are widely used to generate impul-
sive noise. With the advantages of flexibility and accuracy over other models, the
α-stable distribution is applied in many areas, such as, signal processing, underwater
acoustic communications and power line communications [78,79]. The characteristic
function of α-stable distributions is given as
ϕ(t) = exp {jδt− | γt |α (1− jβsign(t)ω(t, α))} , (3.1)
where
ω(t, α) =
tan(πα/2), α 6= 1,−2/π log |t|, α = 1.
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The alpha-stable distribution S(α, β, γ, δ) has four parameters, α, β, γ and δ.
The characteristic exponent α (α ∈ (0, 2]) represents the tail-heaviness of the pdf.
When α = 2, the pdf is Gaussian and when α decreases, the noise becomes more
impulsive. The skewness is denoted by β, the dispersion is denoted by γα, which is
a measure of the spread of the noise and the location parameter is denoted as δ [65].
The alpha-stable distribution is called symmetric if β is 0. Then the characteristic
function is
ϕ(t) = exp (jδt− γα | t |α) . (3.2)
By performing the inverse Fourier transform (IFT) of the characteristic function
we can obtain the pdf of a SαS random variable, x ∼ S(α, 0, 0, γ) is






There are two special SαS distributions that have closed form expressions. When
α = 1, the noise is Cauchy and the pdf is given as




γ2 + (x− δ)2
, (3.4)
when α = 2, the distribution is Gaussian and the standard pdf is












For α = 2, the noise is Gaussian and has a finite variance σ2 defined as σ2 = 2γ2.
As α decreases, the tail of the pdf becomes thicker and can be observed in Fig. 3.1,
which shows the pdf of standard SαS distributions with different α.
Since almost all SαS distributions have infinite variance, the conventional defini-
tion of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) based on second-order statistics is no longer
applicable. Therefore, we use the geometric SNR (SNRK) instead [80]. The geomet-






















Figure 3.1: Standard SαS distributions(γ = 1, δ = 0).









where B2 is the transmitted energy of the modulated signal and the constant 1
2Ck
ensures SNRK remains valid when the noise is Gaussian (i.e. when α = 2). In this
thesis we set B = 1 and Eb
N0















where R is the code rate.
Here we list several important properties of SαS distribution, which are explained
in [65,81].
Property 1. A random variable X is stable if and only if
a1X1 + a2X2
d
= aX + b, (3.9)
where a1, a2, a and b are arbitrary constants and X1 and X2 are independent ran-
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dom variables having the same distribution as X. X
d
= Y denotes that X and Y
have the same distribution.
Property 2. The generalized central limit theorem shows that the sum of a number
of SαS distributed random variables will tend to a stable distribution.
Property 3. For a SαS random variable vα with dispersion γ, we have
lim
x→∞













Property 4. If vi ∼ S(α, 0, 0, γi), i = 1, 2, · · · , N , then
∑N









Property 5. With a constant c, if v ∼ S(α, 0, 0, γ), then cv ∼ S(α, 0, 0, |c|γ).
Property 6. Any SαS random variable v ∼ S(α, 0, 0, γ) can be classified as α-




where A and G are independent. A ∼ S(α/2, 1, 0, [cos(πα/4)]2/α) is a skewed α-
stable random variable and G ∼ N(0, 2γ2) is a Gaussian random variable.
3.2 Physical Layer Security
To illustrate the general concept of physical layer security, a three-node wireless
network system model is shown as an example in Fig. 3.2, where the communication
between terminals T1 and T2 is being intercepted by an unauthorized receiver T3.
The communication channel between the legitimate users is called the main channel
and the communication channel between T1 and T3 is the eavesdropper’s channel.
19





Figure 3.2: Eavesdropping in wireless communication.
3.2.1 Wiretap Channel Model
As a breakthrough in communications security, physical layer security achieves se-
cure transmissions without the need of any form of pre-shared secret within the
group of legitimate users. Security can be achieved through the physical layer, by
only exploiting the difference between the channels of legitimate receivers and those
of potential eavesdroppers. This is well represented by Wyner’s [3] wiretap channel
model, as shown in Fig.3.3. Wyner presented the wiretap channel [3] in 1975, in
which there is a transmitter (Alice) sending confidential information to a legitimate
receiver (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). SK denotes a K-bit message
that Alice wishes to send to Bob. It is assumed that S is a uniformly distributed
random variable that takes values in {0, 1}K . This sequence is transmitted across
the main channel, which is modeled as a discrete memoryless channel and the wire-
tap channel resulting in the corresponding channel outputs Y N and ZN .Finally, the




















Figure 3.3: The wiretap channel of Wyner, where the eavesdropper’s channel is
degraded compared to the main channel.
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3.2.2 Secure Coding Measurement
The purpose of designing a coding scheme with physical layer security is to ensure
reliable and secure communication when the message length K tends to infinity.
The error probability Pr for the original message U is a measurement of reliability,








Security is usually measured using the normalized mutual information I (U ;Z )
between the original message U and the observations Z by the eavesdropper, which
is a measurement of Eve’s uncertainty and can be represented by:
lim
k→∞
I (U ;Z ) = 0. (3.13)
In Fig. 3.3, Wyner [3] assumes both the main channel CM and wiretap channel
CW are DMCs, and CW is less than CM . He proved that this kind of system is
characterized by a constant secrecy capacity Cs and there exists a coding scheme
that achieves secrecy capacity. For the degraded wiretap channel [5] with additive
Gaussian noise, secrecy capacity Cs is the difference between the Shannon capacity
of the main channel CM and wiretap channels CW
Cs = CM − CW . (3.14)




{I (U ;Y )− I (U ;Z ) , 0} . (3.15)
Secrecy capacity of the classical wiretap channel model is shown in Fig. 3.4.
It is the theoretical secrecy capacity for an infinite size constellation and mapping
technologies are not involved with the capacity. Also, it is assumed the BER per-
formances are optimal, using a Shannon limit code. Clearly, secrecy capacity is
proportional to the difference in the signal to noise ratio between the main channel
and the eavedropper’s channel.
21
3.3 Polar Codes
SNR on main channel





















Figure 3.4: Secrecy capacity of classical wiretap channel model.
3.3 Polar Codes
Polar codes were proposed by Arikan [18] based on the novel concept named channel
polarization [17] and have been proved to achieve channel capacity for any symmet-
ric B-DMC. With their low encoding and decoding complexity, polar codes have
excellent performance and have now been included in the 5G standard by 3GPP. In
this section, we introduce the basic theoretical background, encoding and decoding
algorithms of polar codes. Moreover, the performance of polar codes on AWGN is
presented.
3.3.1 Overview
From the perspective of algebraic coding and probability, polar codes have their own
characteristics. First, as long as the block length is given, the code structure of the
polarization code is uniquely determined, and the coding process can be completed
by generating a matrix, which is consistent with the common thinking of algebraic
coding. Secondly, the polar code does not consider the minimum distance in the
design, but uses the process of channel combination and channel splitting to select
a specific coding scheme, and a probabilistic algorithm is also used in the decoding.
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For a N = 2n, n = 1, 2, . . . length polar codes, N independent channels W











. As the code length N increases, the split channel
will tend to two extremes: some of the split channels will approach a perfect channel,
that is, a noiseless channel with a channel capacity approaching 1; the other part of
the split channels will converge to nearly noisy channels, that is, the channel capacity
approaches zero. Assuming that the binary input symmetric capacity of the original
channel W is denoted as I(W ), when the code length N approaches infinity, the split
channel ratio whose channel capacity approaches 1 is approximately K = N×I(W ),
and the ratio of channels’ capacity approaching zero is approximately N×(1−I(W )).
For a reliable bit channel with a channel capacity of 1, the information bits can be
transmitted directly without any coding; and for an unreliable bit channel with a
channel capacity of 0, a frozen bit can be placed which are known in advance to
both the transmitting point and the receiving point. Then, when the code length
N → ∞, the reachable coding rate of a polar code is R = N × I(W )/N = I(W ),
that is, in theory, polar codes can be proved to achieve channel capacity.
In the process of polar code encoding, first we must distinguish the reliability
of N split bit channels, ie, which belong to the reliable channel and which belong
to the unreliable channel. There are three methods commonly used to measure the
reliability of polarization channels: the Bhattacharyya Parameter method, the DE
method, and the GA method.
• Initially, polar codes use the Bhattacharyya parameter Z(W ) as the reliability
metric for each split channel, and the larger Z(W ) is the lower the reliability of
the channel. When the channel W is a Binary Erasure Channel, each Z(W
(i)
N )
can be calculated recursively with a complexity of O(N logN). However, for
other channels, such as binary-input symmetric channel or binary-input Ad-




• In order to estimate the error probability of each bit channel, Mori et al.
proposed a method of using the density evolution to track each bit channel’s
probability density function (pdf). This method is applicable to any binary-
input discrete memoryless channel.
• In most research scenarios, the channel coding model is the BAWGNC chan-
23
3.3 Polar Codes
nel. Under the BAWGNC channel, the pdf of LLR in density evolution can be
approximated by a Gaussian distribution with variance is two times the mean,
which simplifies the calculation of the one-dimensional mean and greatly re-
duces the amount of calculation. This simplified calculation for DE is called
Gaussian approximation.
3.3.2 Preliminaries
Polar codes were first proposed for an arbitrary B-DMC. A generic B-DMC can be
wrote as W : X→ Y includes input alphabet X, output alphabet Y, and transition
probabilities W (y|x), x ∈ X, y ∈ Y. The input alphabet X = {0, 1}, the output
alphabet and the transition probabilities can be arbitrary. Here WN is applied to








Given a B-DMC W , there are two important channel parameters: the symmetric
capacity







W (y|x) log W (y|x)1
2




and the Bhattacharyya parameter




W (y|0)W (y|1). (3.17)
I (W ) is used as measure of rate and is the highest rate at which reliable commu-
nication is possible across W when the inputs of W have equal probability. Z (W )
is an upper bound on the probability of the ML decision error when W is used only
once to transmit a 0 or 1, which is the measurement of reliability.
The range of I(W ) and Z(W ) is [0, 1]. Since the logarithm is base 2, the unit of
code rate and channel capacity is ’bit’. I(W ) and Z(W ) satisfy such a relationship:
I(W ) ≈ 1 iff Z(W ) ≈ 0, and I(W ) ≈ 0 iff Z(W ) ≈ 1.
Proposition 1 [18]:
I (W ) ≥ log 2




I (W ) ≤
√
1− Z (W )2. (3.19)
3.3.3 Channel Polarization
The process of channel polarization consists of channel combining and channel split-
ting. N mutually independent B-DMC channels are combined into WN by a linear




N , 1 6 i 6 N
}
,
which are the concrete realization process of channel polarization.
3.3.3.1 Channel Combining
At this stage, after combining with N independent copies of B-DMC W, a vector
channel WN : X
N → YN is generated recursively, where N is a power of 2 N =
2n, n ≥ 0. During this process the total channel capacity is constant. The detailed











where GN is the generator matrix of polar codes, u
N
1 is a vector of all output














Figure 3.5: The channel combining and splitting.
A recursive manner starts at level 0 (n=0), using only 1 copy of W and defining
W1 , W . Level 1 (n=1) recursively combines two independent copies of W . As
shown in Fig. 3.6, the vector channel W2 : X












Figure 3.6: The channel W2.
probability is
W2 (y1, y2|u1, u2) = W (y1|u1 ⊕ u2)W (y2|u2)






In Fig. 3.6, the input variable u21 of channel W2 maps to the input variable x
2
1









The second level (n = 2) of the recursion combines two independent copies of
W2 as shown in Fig. 3.7 and obtains the channel W4 : X




















The operator R4 in Fig. 3.7 is a permutation, known as the reverse shuffle
operation, which maps (s1, s2, s3, s4) into v
4
1 = (s1, s3, s2, s4).The input variable u
4
1
of channel W4 maps to the input variable x
4
1 of channel W






1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
 = [u1,u2,u3,u4]G4, (3.24)
where G4 =

1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0






























Figure 3.7: The channel W4 and its relation to W2 and W .
The general form of the recursion is shown in Fig. 3.8 where two indepen-
dent copies of WN/2 are combined to generate the channel WN : X
N → YN . The
input vector uN1 to WN is first transformed into s
N
1 so that s2i−1 = u2i−1 ⊕ u2i
and s2i = u2i for 1 6 i 6 N/2. The operator RN in Fig. 3.8 is a permuta-
tion, known as the reverse shuffle operation, and acts on its input sN1 to produce
vN1 = (s1, s3, · · · sN−1, s2, s4, · · · sN), which becomes the input to the two copies of
WN/2 as shown in the Fig. 3.8.
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Finally, it can be inferred that for any polar code with a code length of N ,
(N = 2n, n ≥ 0), the generator matrix GN = BNF
⊗
n
2 , BN is the bit-reversal per-
mutation matrix, which acts as an exchange of the following matrix. For example
when N = 8, then the row numbers of F
⊗
3
2 are (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), the correspond-
ing binary representation is (000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111) and after the bit
inversion conversion is (000, 100, 010, 110, 001, 101, 011, 111), the corresponding dec-
imal representation is (0, 4, 2, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7). F
⊗
n









1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
























































Figure 3.8: Construction of WN from two copies of WN/2.
3.3.3.2 Channel Splitting
This is the second phase of channel polarization. The composite channel WN formed
by combining the channels is split into N binary input coordinate channels W iN
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denotes the output of W
(i)
N and ui its input. The transition prob-
abilities of the odd-sequence splitbit channel and the even-order split bit channel































































Here we list two important theorems of channel polarization, which are proposed
in [18].
Theorem 1: For any B-DMC W , the channels W
(i)
N polarize in the sense that,
for any fixed δ ∈ (0, 1), as N goes to infinity through powers of two, the fraction of
indices i ∈ {i, · · · , N} for which I(W (i)N ) ∈ (1− δ, 1] goes to I(W ) and the fraction
for which I(W
(i)
N ) ∈ [0, δ) goes to 1− I(W ).
We assume W is a BEC with erasure probability ε = 0.5 to show the polarization
effect in Fig. 3.9. The numbers of I(W
(i)
N ) have been calculated by the following
recursive relations with I(W
(1)
1 ) = 1− ε.
I(W
(2i−1)





































Figure 3.9: Plot of I(W
(i)
N ), where i = 1, · · · , N = 211 for a BEC with ε = 0.5.
Theorem 2: For any B-DMC W with I (W ) > 0, and any fixed R < I (W ),
there exists a sequence of sets AN ⊂ {1, · · · , N} , N ∈
{
1, 2, · · · , 2N , · · ·
}
, such that










for all i ∈ AN .
3.3.4 Codes Construction
In the construction of a polar code, the probability of error during channel trans-
mission is more normally applied, that is, the unreliable Z (W ) of the channel W
described in (3.17). The larger the Z (W ), the worse the reliability of the channel.
After channel polarization is performed on N arbitrary B-DMC channels W to ob-
tain a polarized channel W iN (i = 1, 2, · · · , N). Let event Ai denote ”the information












1 |ui) < W iN(yN1 , ui−11 |ui ⊕ 1). (3.29)
Let P (Ai) denote the error probability of the polarized channel W
i
N . Next we
will explain the polar method used for constructing polar codes: Bhattacharyya
parameter method, DE and GA.
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3.3.4.1 Bhattacharyya Parameter Method
Z(W ) is an upper bound when channel W uses maximum-liklihood (ML) to decide
the error probability, and is mainly used to measure the reliability of channel W .
When discussing the channel polarization, Arikan focuses on the binary discrete
memoryless channel (B-DMC). However, the applicable range of the Bhattacharyya
parameter Z (W ) that needs to be calculated when constructing the polar code is
the binary erase channel (BEC). BEC is a subset of B-DMC. Therefore, this method
can only be applied on the BEC.
Proposition 2: Assume (W,W )↔ (W ′,W ′′) for any binary-input channels. Then
Z(W ′′) = Z(W )2, (3.30)
Z(W ′) ≤ 2Z(W )− Z(W )2, (3.31)
Z(W ′) ≥ Z(W ) ≥ Z(W ′). (3.32)
If the channel W is BEC, the (3.31) is an equality.
When N = 2n, the parameters Z(W
(i)
















If the channel W is BEC, (3.33) is an equality. For the special case that W is a BEC
with an erasure probability ε the error probability of each polarized bit channel W iN
is
P (Ai) = 0.5Z(W
(i)
N ). (3.35)
Since the Bhattacharyya parameter can only be exactly calculated under the
BEC, Arikan proposed a heuristic method in [19] by considering other channels as




When the channel is not a BEC channel, such as a BSC or a BAWGNC, it is beyond






of each split bit channel cannot be
accurately obtained. In order to more accurately estimate the reliability of each
split bit channel in channel polarization, Mori et al. [20] proposed a construction
method named DE. This method is applicable to all types of B-DMC. The algorithm
of DE is performed on the Tanner graph.
Since the bit values of the variable nodes only have two values zero or one, the






















Using recursive expressions (3.33) and (3.34), we can obtain the recursive formula























































1 ) > 0,
1, otherwise.
(3.39)
Consider the LLR of a variable node as a random variable with a pdf represented
by a(z). Assume channel W is symmetric when the all-zero codeword is transmitted,





Let us denote a
(i)






1 ). The pdf of the i-th polarized
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where aw is pdf of LLR of the original channel W when sending an all-zero sequence,
? and ~ are the convolution operations in the variable node domain and check node
domain, respectively [82]. The error probability of each polarized bit channel is
shown as follows:







For a Gaussian channel, the pdf of the LLR in the DE algorithm can be approximated
by a Gaussian distribution, where the variance is twice the mean, which can greatly
reduce the computational complexity. This simplification of the DE algorithm is
called Gaussian Approximation (GA).
If we assume the channel is Gaussian, the initial message can be calculated as
L(y) = ln
W (y|x = 0)





Assuming that an all zeros codeword with length N is transmitted and a BPSK
modulation is used. Denote the LLRs of xN1 as L
N
1 , which are Gaussian random












For a Gaussian distribution with a mean of m and variance of σ2, σ2 = 2m. Let us
denote a
(i)



















































4 (1 = 3
7x
)), x ≥ 10.



















Table 3.1 shows the complexity of polar codes constructed using different meth-
ods.








Arikan [18], takes advantage of the polarization effect to construct codes that achieve
the symmetric channel capacity I(W ) by a method called polar coding. The com-
plexity of recursive encoder is only O(N log N ). The basic idea of polar coding is
to create a coding system where one can access each W
(i)
N coordinate bit-channel







near 0. That is, the information bits are assigned to the polarized channels which
are almost noiseless, while the frozen bits are assigned to noisy channels.
Polar codes have a codeword length of N = 2n, n = 1, 2, . . ., and information
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length K. The information source u = (u1, u2, ..., un) includes K information bits
and N −K frozen bits which are given fixed values of 0. The codeword x with code
rate R = K/N can be obtained as x = uGN , where GN = BNF
⊗
n
2 is the generator
matrix, BN is the bit-reversal permutation matrix and F
⊗
n
2 is the n-th Kronecker




In order to better explain the encoding process, this section will give an example







1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 .




1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
⇒ R4 =

1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0




B4 = R4(I2 ⊗B2) =

1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
 ·

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 =

1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

.




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0





B8 = R8(I2 ⊗B4) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0


















1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0














1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

.





1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

.
For a BEC channel with ε = 0.5, we have Z(W ) = 1 − ε = .5, using (3.33) and
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(3.34) to calculate {Z(W i8)} , i = 1, 2, · · · , 8. Arrange Z(W i8) in descending order,
selects the smallest four-bit channel numbers to form the information bits index set
{4, 6, 7, 8}. Let the information bits be {1, 1, 1, 1} then u81 = {0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1}









1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0








3.3.6.1 Successive Cancellation Decoding
The successive cancellation (SC) decoding algorithm is employed to decode polar
codes and can achieve channel capacity [18]. Let A and Ac denote the index sets of
information bits and frozen bits, respectively. The information source uN1 contains
information bits uA and frozen bits uAc . In the decoding process, the estimated
value ûi of bit ui is decided bit-by-bit, based on the output of the received signal
yN1 and the previous detected estimates û
i−1
1 . This is achieved by computing the
transfer probability p (yi|xi) of the polarized channel W iN when ûi = 0 and ûi = 1.
The decision of ui is made as follows [18]:
ûi =
 ui, i ∈ Ac,hi(yN1 , ûi−11 ), i ∈ A. (3.47)
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1 ) > 0,
1, otherwise.
(3.50)
The calculation of the LLR can be done by recursion. Now define the functions f
and g as follows:
f(a, b, us) = (−1)u3a+ b (3.51)




where, a, b ∈ R, us ∈ {0, 1}. The recursive operation of the LLR is represented by








































1,e , û2i−1) (3.54)
L
(i)










1 ) of the polarized
bit channels can be calculated, then use (3.47) and (3.48) to obtain the estimate ûi
of ui.























































































6,  𝑢2 ⨁ 𝑢4
𝑦3
4,  𝑢3 ⨁ 𝑢4
𝑦1
2,  𝑢1 ⨁ 𝑢2⨁ 𝑢3⨁ 𝑢4
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Figure 3.11: Calculation phase of the estimated value û1 of the first input bit u1.
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length N = 8. Since the SC decoding algorithm is a bit-by-bit decoding process,
the known condition required for decoding the i-th bit ui is the estimation of the
received signal yNi and the estimate of the previous i− 1 bits, so that the estimated
value û1 of u1 should be calculated first in Fig. 3.10. According to (3.47), we first
determine whether the bit is a frozen bit, and if so, directly determine û1 = u1 = 0; if
not, perform the decoding process according to Fig. 3.10. In Fig. 3.10, SC decoding


























3) of note 6. Node
3 needs node 4 and 5 LLRs L
(1)
1 (y1) and L
(1)
1 (y2). Similar to the previous process,
the LLRs of node 9 to node 15 are calculated, and the LLR of the upper node can




1) of u1, and then the estimated value û1 of
u1 can be determined according to (3.48).
Fig. 3.11 describes the calculation phase of the estimated value û1 of the first
input bit u1, which corresponds to Fig. 3.10. When the estimate û1 of the first input
bit u1 is determined the second input bit can be determined. The process is similar
to the previous bit, but the resulting estimate û1 is added until the 8-th input bit
gets the estimated value and the decoding process finish.
We give the BER and frame error rate (FER) performances of different length
polar code with SC decoder on AWGN channel in Fig. 3.12 and Fig. 3.13. In
simulations, polar codes have a code rate Rc = 0.5 and are constructed using a
heuristic method, with the maximum number of frames set to 10000. We can observe
that, with a fixed value of code rate, the bit error rate and frame error rate get
lower with the increasing code length of the polar code, which means the decoding
performance increases. The main reason of this is with the increase of code length
N the phenomenon of channel polarization is becoming more and more obvious.
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3.3.6.2 Successive Cancellation List Decoding
For a polar code when the code length approaches infinity, the channel will polarize
completely. However, with a limited code length, there are still some information
bits that cannot be decoded correctly because the channel polarization is not com-
plete. When an error occurs in the decoding of the previous i− 1 information bits,
due to the SC decoder needing the estimated value of the previous information bits
when decoding the subsequent information bits, this will cause a more serious error
transmission. The SC decoding algorithm is a greedy algorithm. For each layer of
the code tree, only the optimal path is searched and the next layer is performed.
Therefore, errors cannot be modified. The SCL decoding algorithm is an improve-
ment on the SC algorithm. This thesis focuses on the security performance and all
works based on SC decoding. Here we will show simulation results of polar codes
with SCL decoding on AWGN channel and the specific explanation of SCL decoding














Figure 3.14: BER performance of heuristic-constructed polar codes on AWGN chan-
nel under SCL decoding with different list size.
The BER performance of a length N = 2048, rate 0.5 polar code constructed
using the heuristic method for various list sizes can be seen in Fig. 3.14. When the
list size is equal to 1 it is SC decoding. We observed with list size increasing the
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BER performance is improving.
In Table 3.2 we give a complexity comparison of polar decoding methods.
Table 3.2: a complexity comparison decoding of polar codes
Decoding
Algorithms Complexity
SC [18] O(N log N ) low
SCL [22] O(LN log N ) medium
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, physical layer security technique has been explained in detail, which
includes the wiretap channel model, security measurement. In addition, the SαS
noise model has been explained in detail. This chapter has also given the details of
the encoding and the decoding of polar codes. To analyze the asymptotic perfor-
mance of polar codes, density evolution, Gaussian approximation and heuristic have
been described in detail. To conclude, this chapter provides the essential background
theory for the following novel chapters.
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Chapter 4
Construction of Polar Codes
Combined with Physical Layer
Security on Impulsive Noise
Channels
4.1 Introduction
Polar codes are the first proven capacity-achieving codes for any symmetric binary
input discrete memoryless channel (B-DMC) and their has been recent interest in
their combination with the popular area of physical layer security.
Current literature on polar codes combined with physical layer security assumes
that noise added at the recipient’s and eavesdropper’s receiver has a Gaussian distri-
bution. However, the distribution of noise in wireless communication systems is not
always Gaussian due to other sources of noise, such as impulsive noise. Symmetric
α-stable (SαS) distributions [84] are commonly used to accurately model impulsive
noise channels, due to their heavy-tailed distributions, and are used in this work.
We would like to explore polar codes’ performance in the presence of impulsive noise,
particular when combined with security, to assess whether it can still achieve high
security and performance. In addition to evaluating the performance of polar codes
on an impulsive wiretap channel, we are also interested in the scenario where the
main channel is more impulsive than the eavesdropper’s channel and whether secure
communication is still possible.
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Motivated by the above observations and the lack of published work on the analy-
sis of polar codes on more general memoryless channels, we present the construction
of polar codes combined with physical layer security, where each user experiences
varying levels of impulsive noise. The polar codes are constructed using density
evolution (DE), which has knowledge of the α-stable noise distribution, in order to
construct optimal codes for this environment. To ensure secure communication, the
bit-channels are divided into three sections within the polar codeword: information
bits, random bits and frozen bits [31]. Therefore, the intended recipient will re-
ceive information bits on some of their good channels, while the eavesdropper will
only receive random bits on their good channels, as explained later in this chapter.
We expand the work of [31] to evaluate the performance of polar codes on wiretap
channels where each user experiences varying levels of impulsive noise for the first
time.
In this chapter, we first examine the security performance of polar codes con-
structed with different values of design-SNR on Gaussian wiretap channels. In ad-
dition, we evaluate the BER performance of polar codes constructed by density DE
and heuristic methods on SαS channels for different values of α. Finally, the con-
struction of polar codes combined with physical layer security on additive impulsive
noise has been derived. Simulation results confirm that the BER at the eavesdropper
is always 0.5 for all signal-to-noise ratios, thus always ensuring secure communica-
tion, and we present the very interesting result where this is still achieved when the
main channel is more impulsive than the eavesdropper’s channel.
4.2 System Model
In this section, we first explain the system model in detail. As shown in Fig. 4.1, in
which there is a transmitter (Alice) sending confidential information to a legitimate
receiver (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). U denotes a K-bit secret
information that Alice intends to send to Bob. It is assumed that U is a uniformly
distributed random vector that takes values in {0, 1}K . The outputs of the polar
encoder X are transmitted across the main channel and eavesdropped by Eve, re-
sulting in the corresponding channel outputs Y and Z. Finally, the polar decoder
maps Y and Z into the estimate ÛB and ÛE of the original message detected by
Bob and Eve.
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Figure 4.1: Block diagram of a polar coded wiretap channel system.
4.3 Design of Polar Codes on Gaussian Wiretap
Channel
For the Gaussian wiretap channel model, it assume that the noise of main channel
and eavesdropper channel are Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN). We assume
that the AWGN channel is a binary input channel so polar codes constructed by a
heuristic method can be used on the Gaussian wiretap channel to ensure security.
The design of polar codes combined with physical layer security is shown in Fig.
4.2. The basic idea of this proposed coding scheme is to transmit information over
those bit-channels that are only noiseless for Bob but noisy for Eve, while filling bit
channels that are noiseless for both Bob and Eve with random bits and sending zeros
on the remaining bit channels. The most important part of secure polar coding is
the selection of the bit channels of the information bits for the main channel and
the wiretap channel. For the Gaussian wiretap channel we use a heuristic method
to construct polar codes and the Successive Cancellation decoder is employed for
the decoding process.
4.3.1 Design-SNR of Polar Codes
Different from most codes in coding theory, polar codes have an important charac-
teristic which is their non-universality. That is, the definition of polar codes depends
on a specified value of SNR, known as design-SNR. Arikan gives the set F of polar
codes in the sense that the block error rate (BLER) of polar codes is minimum
under SC decoding. As BLER is a function of SNR, the polar code will change with
different given design-SNRs.
In Fig. 4.3 we plot the BERs performance of different design-SNRs of polar codes
constructed by a heuristic method with a SC decoder on the AWGN channel, where
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Bit-channels good for both 
Bob and Eve







































Figure 4.3: The effect of design-SNR of polar code with code length N = 2048 and
code rate R = 0.5.
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4.3 Design of Polar Codes on Gaussian Wiretap Channel
the code length is N = 2048 and code rate is R = 0.5. We can observe that the
change of design-SNR is significant in terms of the BER performance of polar codes.
This difference is the main point of our secure polar coding scheme for Gaussian
wiretap channels.
4.3.2 Degraded Gaussian Wiretap Channel
The noise in the main channel and wiretap channel are denotes N1 and N2, when
N1 ∼ N(0, σ21), N2 ∼ N(0, σ22), and N1 and N2 are independent. If the variances
of noise satisfy σ21 < σ
2
1, that is, the noise of the main channel is smaller than the
noise of the eavesdropping channel, it is considered that the eavesdropper channel is
worse than the main channel and the wiretap channel is called the degraded wiretap
channel.
In this section we first show the performance of conventional polar codes without
any secure design on the degraded wiretap channel. First a polar code with code
length N = 2048 and code rate R = K/N = 0.5 is constructed by a heuristic
method explained in chapter 3. After the polar encoder, the codeword is transmitted
to Bob through an AWGN channel, without secure encoding so Eve can receive
the same codeword. In order to prevent Eve from receiving useful information
we assume Eve’s channel is worse than Bob’s channel, and this can be achieve by
the difference between the SNRs of Bob and Eve, called the Signal-to-Noise Ratio
gap SNRg = SNRM − SNRW , where SNRM and SNRW represent the SNR of
main channel between Alice and Bob and eavesdropper channel between Alice and
Eve, respectively. If SNRg is positive the wiretap channel is non-degraded, and the
smaller SNRg is, the more capable Eve’s channel is. Finally, the original information
detected by Bob and Eve will be obtained by the SC decoder. Fig. 4.4 gives the BER
performance of this method. The simulation results show that as the SNRg increases
the secure and reliable zone becomes larger, while secure and reliable communication
cannot achieved in higher SNRs. In that case we apply secure polar codes to achieve
secure communication.
The most important part of secure polar coding is the selection of the index set
As of the secure information bits for the main channel and the eavesdropper channel.
As describe in the previous section, the change of design-SNR will influence polar
codes, thus we use design-SNR to select As. First, we give two different design-SNRs,
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Figure 4.4: BER performance of heuristic-constructed polar codes for the degraded
Gaussian wiretap channel, where SNRg = 3dB, 6dB and 9dB.
then apply them separately with the heuristic method to construct polar codes with
the same code length N and code rate R = 0.5 to produce two different sets of error
probability P (Ai) of each polarized bit channel. Then order them separately and
save the bit index. Define the information index set Ai1 and Ai2 and frozen index
set Af1 and set Af2. The intersection of Ai1 and Af2 is As; the intersection of Ai1
and Ai2 is B, which is the index set for random bits; and others are set as frozen
bits index.
Encoding Algorithm: The message u ∈ {0, 1}s and a vector e ∈ {0, 1}r are the
inputs of the encoder with the function ε : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n, where s and
r are the length of information bits and random bits and n is the length of the
codeword. First, the encoder generates a vector v ∈ {0, 1}n, by letting vR = e ,
vAs = u , and vB = 0 , where R, A
s and B are the set of random bits, information
bits and zeros. The output of the encoder is x = vGN = vBNF
⊗
n
2 . The secrecy
code rate is Rs = r/n.
Decoding Algorithm: The input of the decoder is a vector y ∈ yn which is the
output of the channel. It then applies the SC decoding algorithm and the decoder
output is v̂As .
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Noise Channels
Table 4.1: the secrecy code rate for the different design-SNR in dB
N K design-SNRB design-SNRE R Rs
2048 1024 -1.59 0 0.5 0.0078
2048 1024 -1.59 3 0.5 0.0400
2048 1024 -1.59 6 0.5 0.0767
2048 1024 -1.59 9 0.5 0.0869
2048 1024 0 3 0.5 0.0322
2048 1024 0 6 0.5 0.0688
2048 1024 0 9 0.5 0.0791
The most important part of secure polar coding is the selection of the index set
As of the information bits for the main channel and the wiretap channel. For polar
codes constructed by the heuristic method on degraded Gaussian wiretap channel,
the information bits can be selected differently for Bob and Eve by different design-
SNRs. Table 4.1 shows the secrecy code rate for the different design-SNR in dB.
4.4 Construction and Secure Transmission of Po-
lar Codes on Impulsive Noise Channels
4.4.1 Design of Polar Codes on SαS Channels
As stated in the literature review, polar codes show good performance on channels
with Gaussian noise, but in this section we are interested in their performance on
impulsive noise channels with SαS distributions.
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Noise Channels
4.4.1.1 Channel Model
We consider a polar-coded system with a codeword of length N bits. In order to
generate the transmitted signal the codeword is mapped on to a binary phase shift
keying (BPSK) constellation. The received signal is impaired by additive impulsive
noise with a SαS distribution which is defined as
yk = xk + ηk, (4.1)
where yk is the k-th received signal, xk ∈ {−1,+1} is the BPSK symbol, ηj is an
SαS distributed noise sample and k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
4.4.1.2 Density Evolution of Polar Codes on SαS Channels
Polar codes can be constructed by several methods, such as the heuristic method, DE
and GA. As introduced in Chapter 3 the heuristic method and GA are construction
methods for channels with Gaussian noise, which is not of interest in our wok.
However, DE can be applied to any binary memoryless symmetric channels (BMSC).
As impulsive noise we interest in has a SαS distribution, which is non-Gaussian
distribution. Therefore, DE can be employed to design optimal polar codes for
impulsive noise channels and we examine the performance of the polar codes with
impulsive noise.
According to [70], the channel output of SαS noise and the LLR is symmetric,
hence DE can be performed. Let us denote d
(i)






















where ? and ~ are the convolution operations in the variable node domain and
check node domain, respectively [82]. The error probability of the i-th bit channel














, where d11(y) is the pdf
of the initial LLRs. For DE, it starts with the calculation of the pdf of the initial








fα(y − 1; γ)




4.5 Results and Discussion
However, the pdf of (4.3) can only be evaluated numerically. After obtaining P
(i)
e
for the i -th bit channel, the DE construction method chooses the K bit channels
with the smallest P
(i)
e for the information bits and the remaining N−K bit channels
for frozen bits.
4.4.2 Polar Coding on Wiretap Channels with SαS Noise
In this section we extend the work of [31] to the wiretap channel with SαS impulsive
noise. The secure polar coding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. For polar codes
constructed by the heuristic method on SαS channels, the information bits can be
selected differently for Bob and Eve by different design-SNRs. In our simulation,
the design-SNRs are 0dB and 6dB for Bob’s channel and Eve’s channel, respectively.
When polar codes are constructed by the DE method, the error probability of po-
larized channels will be different for different α. Thus, the design-SNR is 0dB for
both Bob and Eve’s channels for DE-constructed polar codes.
For DE-constructed polar codes the selection of the index set As of the secure
information bits for the main channel and the wiretap channel is similar to the
heuristic method. As DE is based on SαS noise, we choose two different values of
α, then apply them separately with the DE method to construct polar codes with
the same code length N and code rate R = 0.5 to produce two different sets of error
probability P (Ai) of each polarized bit channel.
4.5 Results and Discussion
In our work, we use the BER to measure the performance of polar code combined
with physical layer security on wiretap channels. In order to make sure Eve can-
not extract any useful information from Alice, we require that the BER of Bob
approaches 0 while at the same time the BER of Eve is as close to 0.5 as possible.
We use PBr and P
E
r to denote the bit-error probability of Bob and Eve respectively,
which are related by:
PBr
∼= 0, PEr ∼= 0.5. (4.4)
54
4.5 Results and Discussion





















Figure 4.5: BER performance of heuristic-constructed polar codes with design-SNR
of the main channel is 0dB and the eavesdropper channel is 3dB, 6dB and 9dB on
Gaussian wiretap channel, where the SNRg = 3dB.
Fig. 4.5 presents the BER performance of heuristic-constructed polar codes with
the design-SNR of the main channel being 0dB and the eavesdropper channel being
3dB, 6dB and 9dB on the Gaussian wiretap channel, where the main channel is bet-
ter than the eavesdropper channel by 3dB. Fig. 4.6 presents the BER performance
of heuristic-constructed polar codes when the design-SNR of the main channel is
0dB and the eavesdropper channel is 3dB, 6dB and 9dB on the Gaussian wiretap
channel and when the main channel is same as the eavesdropper channel. Fig. 4.7
gives BER performance of heuristic-constructed polar codes when the design-SNR
of the main channel is -1.59dB and the eavesdropper channel is 0dB, 3dB, 6dB
and 9dB on Gaussian wiretap channel, and the main channel is same as the eaves-
dropper channel. Fig. 4.8 illustrates the BER performance of heuristic-constructed
polar codes when the design-SNR of the main channel is 0dB and the eavesdropper
channel is 6dB on Gaussian wiretap channel and the main channel is worse than
the eavesdropper channel with 3dB, 6dB and 9dB difference. It was shown that
with proposed polar coding scheme a secure channel between Alice and Bob can be
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Figure 4.6: BER performance of heuristic-constructed polar codes with design-SNR
of the main channel is 0dB and the eavesdropper channel is 3dB, 6dB and 9dB




















Figure 4.7: BER performance of heuristic-constructed polar codes with design-SNR
of the main channel is -1.59dB and the eavesdropper channel is 0dB, 3dB, 6dB and
9dB on Gaussian wiretap channel, where the SNRg = 0dB.
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Figure 4.8: BER performance of heuristic-constructed polar codes with design-SNR
of the main channel is 0dB and the eavesdropper channel is 6dB on Gaussian wiretap
channel, where the SNRg = -3dB, -6dB and -9dB.
achieved at all SNRs, no matter if the main channel is better, same or worse than
the eavesdropper’s channel.
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4.5.2 Performance of Polar Codes on Impulsive Noise Chan-
nels
4.5.2.1 Performance of Polar Codes on SαS Channels






















Figure 4.9: BER performance of polar codes on SαS impulsive channels with differ-
ent values of α.
Fig. 4.9 presents the BER performance of DE-constructed polar codes with code
length N = 2048 and code rate Rc = 0.5 on SαS impulsive channels with different
values of α and we also provide a performance comparison of the heuristic and
DE-based construction of polar codes. The BER performance is evaluated for SαS
channels with α = 1.1, α = 1.5 and α = 1.9 which represent extremely impulsive,
moderately impulsive and lightly impulsive noise, respectively. We note that the
design-SNR of the heuristic method has already been optimized by experiments.
From the simulation results we can observe that under the same channel conditions,
DE-based construction of polar codes has 0.1 dB gain over polar codes constructed
using heuristic methods for N = 2048 at BER = 10−4 on SαS channels with α =
1.5 and α = 1.9. When the channel is extremely impulsive (α = 1.1), the BER
performance of polar codes constructed by the DE method is still slightly better
than the heuristic method. It proves that DE is a better option for design polar
codes in the presence of impulsive noise.
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4.5.2.2 Performance of Polar Codes on Wiretap Channels with SαS
Noise
To examine the simulated performance of polar codes on wiretap channels with SαS
noise we use a polar code with code length N = 2048 and code rate Rc = 0.5. The
polar code is constructed by heuristic and DE method and the maximum frames
number is set to 10000.




















Figure 4.10: BER performance of DE-constructed polar codes on wiretap channel,
where the main channel is impulsive with different values of α (1.1, 1.5 and 1.9) and
the eavesdropper channel is Gaussian.
In Fig. 4.10, the polar code constructed using DE is transmitted over an AWGN
channel to Eve while Bob’s channel has varying levels of impulsiveness, with α = 1.1,
α = 1.5 and α = 1.9. In Fig. 4.11 we considered both main channel (α = 1 and
α = 1.5) and eavesdropper channel (α = 1.9) as impulsive noise channels, where
the former is more impulsive than the latter. This means that in both figures
the main channel is more impulsive than the eavesdropper’s channel. Figs. 4.10
and 4.11 show the simulated performance of Bob and Eve for different wiretap
channels. We observe that with different values of α, the BER of Bob approaches
zero with increasing SNR, however most importantly the BER of Eve is very close
to 0.5 at all SNRs. This shows that the proposed physical layer security scheme
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Figure 4.11: BER performance of DE-constructed polar codes on wiretap channel,
where the main channel is impulsive with different values of α (1, 1.5) and the
eavesdropper channel is slightly impulsive with α=1.9.























Figure 4.12: BER performance of heuristic-constructed and DE-constructed polar
codes on wiretap channel, where the main channel is impulsive with different values
of α (1.1, 1.5 and 1.9) and the eavesdropper channel is Gaussian.
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using DE-constructed polar codes can still achieve excellent performance and secure
communication, even when the main channel is more impulsive than the wiretap
channel. As shown in Fig. 4.12, we also compare the performance of DE and
heuristic construction methods for different values of α on wiretap channel, where
the main channel is impulsive with different values of α (1.1, 1.5 and 1.9) and the
eavesdropper channel is Gaussian. Compared with Fig. 4.9, the performance of the
DE-based construction is much better than the heuristic method due to the smaller
Rs of the DE-based construction polar codes.
After reviewing the literature, we observed that previous work on error-correcting
codes and physical layer security has assumed a wiretap channel where each user
experiences Gaussian noise, but this chapter presents the first results evaluating the
performance of polar codes on wiretap channels where both the intended recipient
and eavesdropper experience varying levels of impulsive noise. Simulation results
show that DE-based construction of polar codes combined with physical layer secu-
rity still achieve high security and performance in the present of impulsive noise.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the performance of polar codes combined with
physical layer security on different type of wiretap channels. A secure construction
of polar codes has been proposed that provides a good performance and security,
even when the eavesdropper channel is better than the main channel. In addition,
a DE design of the polar codes on SαS channels was presented. Moreover, simula-
tion results of construction of polar codes combined with physical layer security on
impulsive noise channels have been presented to validate the DE analysis.
The simulated results show that the proposed polar coding scheme can achieve
near-optimal performance with only the knowledge of the design-SNR values on de-
graded Gaussian and non-degraded Gaussian wiretap channels. We also observe that
without constructed polar codes, security and reliability can only be achieved within
a limited values of SNRs when Bob’s channel condition is better than Eve’s channel.
However, in real communication we cannot guarantee that, and Eve could have a
better channel than Bob. We can conclude that the proposed polar construction is
a good choice for Gaussian wiretap channels.
In order to better examine the secure performance of polar codes in more gen-
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eral memoryless channels which we are focus on in our work we have shown the
BER performance of polar codes constructed by DE and heuristic methods on SαS
channels for various values of α. We observed that DE constructed polar codes have
better performance than heuristic constructed polar codes on impulsive channels.
That means DE can be used to design optimal polar codes in the present of SαS
noise. We also presented the construction of polar codes using DE on a wiretap
channel with varying levels of impulsive noise and provided simulation results from
Fig. 4.10 to Fig. 4.12 showing the BER performance and security of the system.
These appear to be the first results evaluating the performance of polar codes com-
bined with physical layer security when the noise is impulsive. Most importantly,
it was shown that polar codes can still ensure a secure channel between Alice and
Bob at all SNRs, even when the main channel is more impulsive than the eavesdrop-
per’s channel. This was a surprising result and shows that polar codes are a good
candidate for achieving secure communication systems in more harsh environments
where impulsive noise is present.
62
Chapter 5
Frozen Bit Selection Scheme for
Polar Coding Combined with
Physical Layer Security in the
Presence of Impulsive Noise
5.1 Introduction
In chapter four, the BER performance of polar codes constructed by DE and heuris-
tic methods on additive impulsive noise channels was presented. The simulation
result showed that when the impulsive noise is modelled by SαS distributions the
performance of DE-constructed polar codes perform better than polar codes con-
structed by the heuristic method. Also the security performance of polar codes
constructed by DE and heuristic method on a wiretap channel with varying levels of
SαS noise was presented. All the simulation results show our proposed polar coding
scheme can achieve secure and reliable communication. However, there is a trade-off
between secrecy code rate and system security performance.
In this chapter, in order to increase the secrecy code rate we consider the effect
of frozen bits on polar coding performance. Here, we propose a secure polar coding
scheme with aided Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ), in which the frozen bits are
obtained from the feedback of the legitimate receiver. First we evaluate the BER
performance of polar codes constructed by the heuristic method on Gaussian noise
channels and polar codes constructed by DE on impulsive noise channels with one
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bit error in the frozen bits. Based on the polar codes BER performance with one bit
error in a frozen bit we select the ”optimal” frozen bits to reduce the computational
cost of ARQ between Bob and Alice, and evaluate the performance of the security























Figure 5.1: Diagram of the proposed polar coding structure.
In Fig. 5.1, a diagram of the proposed polar coding structure is illustrated, where
legitimate users Alice and Bob communicate with each other. Alice sends a K-bit
secret message U to a legitimate receiver Bob through the forward main channel
in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. The codeword X after polar encoding
is transmitted across the main channel and eavesdropped by Eve, resulting in the
corresponding received signals Y and Z which decode into the estimates ÛB and ÛE
of the original message detected by Bob and Eve. In addition, before Alice sends U
to Bob, Bob send US which contains N −K random bits to Alice which are used as
frozen bits for Alice. Thus there is a feedback channel between Bob and Eve and an
ARQ protocol is used to enhance communication security, by Cyclic Redundancy
Check (CRC) and retransmissions. However, because of the openness of the wireless
channel, Eve can also eavesdrop information UES from the feedback channel and set
it as the frozen bits for her decoder.
ARQ is a simple error-control method for data transmission, widely used due to
the advantage of providing high system reliability [85,86]. In the ARQ scheme, only
the intended recipient can request retransmission. Thus, when Bob sends informa-
tion to Alice, if there are errors in the received signals, they can be detected by
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CRC, Alice will ask for retransmission until there are no errors. However, Eve does
not have the access to require retransmission, so we can assume beaming forming
and artificial noise [87], [88] to increase the errors for Eve. Here we need to explain
that additional CRC and ARQ will increase the complexity.
5.3 Proposed Coding Method
As mentioned in chapter 4, the polar coding scheme proposed by Mahdavifar and
Vardy [31] divided the polarized channels into different parts to transmit information
bits with bit-channels good for Bob but bad for Eve, random bits on bit-channels
good for both Bob and Eve and zeros on the remaining bit-channels. This method
can achieve the secrecy capacity but with a trade-off in secrecy rate. In this scheme,
the polar codeword with code lengthN is split into three parts: information bits with
length S, random bits with length L and frozen bits length M , where S+L+M = N .
The secrecy rate is defined as the message length divided by the codeword length:
Rs = S/N , but this was very low due to large number of random bits required.
Ideally we would like the secrecy rate to be equal to the code rate of a conventional
polar code with code rate Rc = K/N = 0.5. Hence, in this chapter we consider
the polar coding scheme from the aspect of the decoding process instead of polar
codes construction or encoding process. By applying this method we use all the
K = N/2 bit channels to transmit information to increase the secrecy code rate
Rs = Rc = 0.5.
We observe that in the process of polar codes decoding, the information bits are
decoded sequentially and the frozen bits play an important role when decoding the
information bits. If the previous detected estimates ûi−11 have errors in the frozen






1 ) in (3.49) is unreliable, which will lead to the incorrect
decoding of the information bits. In [33], the authors use this idea to design an
ARQ-aided polar coding scheme. Inspired by their works we propose a more efficient
ARQ-aided polar coding scheme combined with physical layer security on impulsive
noise channels. In [33], all random frozen bits are fed back to Alice, which reduces
the efficiency of this scheme. However, we will show that the same level of security
can still be achieved if only a small proportion of the random frozen bits is fed back,
which increases efficiency.
65
5.3 Proposed Coding Method
5.3.1 Coding Scheme on AWGN Wiretap Channel System
In this section we will first evaluate the BER performance of the polar codes with a
single error in the frozen bits on the AWGN channel in Fig. 5.2, where the SNR is
3dB. In addition, in order to compare with the original work we use a binary polar
code with code length N = 512 , code rate Rc = 0.5 and SC decoder is for the
process of decoding. From the simulation result we can observe that a signal error
in frozen bits has a serious effect on polar decoding.
Channel index of frozen bits













AWGN channel      SNR = 3dB
Figure 5.2: BER performance of polar codes with one bit error in frozen bits with
AWGN.
According to the BER results in Fig. 5.2 and previous discussion our ARQ-
aided polar coding scheme to achieve the reliable and secure communication between
legitimate users Alice and Bob can be described as follows.
ARQ Channel: Before Alice sends confidential information, Bob transmits a S-
bit (S = 32) random sequence Us to Alice. However, due to the openness of wireless
communications Eve can also access this, resulting in the random sequences UAS and
UES received by Alice and Eve respectively. By applying a CRC code and retrans-
mission on the ARQ channel we can make sure UAS is the same as US. Although Eve
may know the indices of frozen bits, we can assume beaming forming and artificial






5.3 Proposed Coding Method
Selection of frozen bit channels for UAs :
• For a N length polar code, set the N −K frozen bits as random bits (0,1).
• Flip each of the N −K frozen bits individually and evaluate the BER perfor-
mance of each of the N −K scenarios on the AWGN channel.
• Choose the largest S ≤ (N −K) BERs, and save the corresponding frozen bit
channels P .
• Assign the random bits which Bob sent to Alice to the set of P frozen bits and
set the others to 0.
Encoding: Alice uses the K information bit channels to send secure messages,
takes the UAs as a part of the frozen bits to encode at the polar encoder and other
frozen bits are set as zeros. After polar encoding, the codeword is transmitted to
Bob via the AWGN channel, but it also can be received by Eve through the AWGN
eavesdropper channel.
Decoding: For the process of SC decoding, Bob use the the sequence where UAs
is a part of the frozen bits, but for Eve’s decoder the received sequence contains UEs .
5.3.2 Coding Scheme on SαS Noise Wiretap Channel Sys-
tem
We first show the BER performance of the polar codes with single errors in the
frozen bits on SαS noise (α=1.3) channel in Fig. 5.3. In order to get the optimal
performance on impulsive noise channels, density evolution is applied to construct
the polar codes which was proposed in [89]. From Fig. 5.3 we can observe the
effect on the BER for each flipped frozen bit in the binary polar codewords, where
code length N = 512, code rate R = 0.5. Our proposed coding scheme for wiretap
channel system with SαS noise is shown as follows:
ARQ Channel: Before Alice sends confidential information, Bob transmits a
S-bit random sequence Us to Alice.
Selection of frozen bit channels for UAs :
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α  = 1.3      SNR = 3dB
Figure 5.3: BER performance of polar codes with one bit error in frozen bits with
SαS noise.
• Flip each of the N −K frozen bits individually and evaluate the BER perfor-
mance of each of the N −K scenarios in the present of impulsive noise with
SαS distribution.
• Choose the largest S ≤ (N −K) BERs, and save the corresponding frozen bit
channels P .
• Assign the random bits UAs received by Alice from Bob which is free of errors
to the set of P frozen bits and set the others to 0.
5.4 Analysis
5.4.1 Reliability
We assume that the communication between Alice and Bob is under the condition
that the frozen bits are error-free. From [90] the following propositions of rate of
polarization are presented:
Proposition 3: For a B-DMC channel W . For any constant rate R < I(W )
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and positive fixed β < 1/2, there must exists a sequence of sets AN with AN ⊂





N ) = o(2
−Nβ). (5.1)
Contrary, if R > 0 and β > 1/2, a sequence of sets AN , where AN ⊂ 1, 2, . . . , N ,










As a corollary, Theorem 3 in [18] is strengthened to:
Proposition 4: For a B-DMC W with polar coding at any constant rate R < I(W )
and arbitrary fixed β < 1/2, we have
Pe(N,R) = o(2
−Nβ), (5.3)
where Pe(N,R) is block error probability for polar coding which is under SC decod-
ing. Then we have
Pe(Û 6= U) ≤ Z(W (i)N ) ≤ o(2
−Nβ). (5.4)
It is easy to see that limN→∞ Pe(Û 6= U) = 0, such that the reliability condition
required in (3.12) can be satisfied.
5.4.2 Security
In [91], the authors first apply iterations of the Bhattacharyya parameter to obtain
the expression of the Bhattacharyya parameter bound. According to this, [33] pro-
posed the following theorem
Theorem 3: For a bit-channel W
(i)
N (0 < i ≤ N) and a fixed λ ∈ [0, 1], if there
exists a parameter group %i1, %
i
2, · · · , %iN , (%ij ∈ [0, 1] , 0 < j ≤ N) that satisfies at
least two of Z(W
(1)
1 ) ≥ %i1, Z(W
(2)
1 ) ≥ %i2, · · · , Z(W
(N)
1 ) ≥ %iN , then
I(W
(i)
N ) ≤ λ, (5.5)
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where the ith use of a physical channel is described by W
(i)
1 (1 ≤ i ≤ N).
Proof : Let us define the function f(ρ) =
√
1− ρ2, ρ ∈ [0, 1], where f is the
monotonic decreasing function of ρ and f(ρ) ∈ [0, 1]. Hence for a fixed λ ∈ [0, 1],
there must exist ρ = ϑ ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies f(ϑ) =
√
1− ϑ2 = λ. Let Z l(W (i)N )














N ) is a monotonic increasing function of Z(W
(i)
1 ), · · ·Z(W
(N)
1 ), we can
conclude that Z(W
(1)




1 ) = %
i
2, · · · , Z(W
(N)
1 ) = %
i




ϑ. Due to the monotonic behaviour of Z l(W
(i)
N ), if Z(W
(1)
1 ) ≥ %i1, Z(W
(2)
1 ) ≥
%i2, · · · , Z(W
(N)
1 ) ≥ %iN we have Z l(W
(i)
N ) ≥ %. According to [18], I(W
(i)
N ) ≤√









1− Z l(W (i)N )2 ≤
√
1− ϑ2 = λ. (5.7)
For Eve, Theorem 3 shows that given λ, IE(W
i





1 ), · · · , Z(W
E(N)
1 ). For BSC, Z(W
E(i)
1 ) = 2
√
ϕiE(1− ϕiE), ϕiE is
the crossover probability of the ith use of the channel [18]. To make the value
Z(W
E(i)
1 ) increase, in the proposed coding scheme, more errors in frozen bits of Eve
will make the channel between Bob and Eve become worse, which leads to ϕiE having
a larger value, and Z(W
E(i)
1 ) become larger. Hence we have
I(uK1 ; z
N




















The inequality (i) is obtained from Shannon’s theory of channel capacity. The
equality (ii) C(W
E(i)
N ) = I(W
E(i)
N ) is proven in [18], [31]. Inequality (iii) is obtained







1 ) ≤ lim
N→∞
|A|λ = 0, (5.9)



















Figure 5.4: A simplified system model of the proposed polar coding scheme.
In order to analyze the achievable secrecy capacity of the proposed secure cod-
ing scheme, a simplified system model is shown in Fig. 5.4, in which both the
main channel and eavesdropper channel are assumed as BSCs. Here, σM and σW
represent the crossover probability of the main channel from Alice to Bob and the
eavesdropper’s channel Alice to Eve,respectively, and the crossover probability of the
feedback channel from Bob to Alice and Bob to Eve are denoted by ϕM and ϕW , re-
spectively. Variables σ and ϕ satisfy an increasing function φ(σ, ϕ), which describes
the crossover probability of the channel combining the forward channel and feedback





. Thus the channel condition of communication between Al-
ice and Bob can be performed by φ(σM , ϕM), and φ(σW , ϕW ) corresponds to Alice
and Eve. Here, we assume the eavesdropper channel is the same condition as the
main channel, such that σM = σW . The ARQ channel from Bob to Alice is able to
obtain an channel that is error-free, which means ϕM = 0, while ϕW > 0. Based
on the previous statement, it is clear that the channel condition between Alice and
Bob is better than that between Alice and Eve, in such case φ(σM , 0) < φ(σW , ϕW ).
For a BSC, the channel capacity can be represent as C(W ) = 1− h(pw), where h(·)
is the binary entropy function and pw is the crossover probability of channel W ,
h(pw = −pw log(pw)− (1− pw) log(1− pw), then we have
CM(W ) = 1− h(φ(σM , 0)), (5.10)
CW (W ) = 1− h(φ(σM , ϕW )). (5.11)
As φ(σM , 0) < φ(σW , ϕW ≤ 12 and h(·) is increasing from 0 to
1
2
, hence we obtain
CM(W ) > CW (W ). In addition, we suppose U
A
S = US, U
E
S = ÛS and according to
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(3.15), the secrecy capacity of our proposed polar coding scheme is:
Cs = max {CM(W )− CW (W ), 0}
= max
{






1 |US)− I(uK1 ;ZN1 |ÛS), 0
}
. (5.12)
Although the main channel and eavesdropper channel have the same channel
condition, Eve’s feedback channel is worse than Bob’s, thus it is obvious we can
obtain Cs > 0. The error rate of U
E











where ues,l and us,l is the lth bit of U
E
s and US. It is clear that P
c
e has an effect
on the secrecy capacity. Here we consider a special case, where we assume there
is a P ce which make Eve’s BER approach to 0.5 using frozen bits with errors, so
I(uK1 ;Z
N
1 |ÛS) = 0. In this case, the maximum secrecy capacity Cs = CM(W ) can
be achieved.
5.5 Results and Discussion
In this section, the BER performance of polar codes combined with physical layer
security on the AWGN channel and the SαS impulsive noise channel is presented.
5.5.1 Performance of Proposed Coding Scheme on AWGN
Wiretap Systems
Figs. 5.5 to 5.7 show the simulation performance of Bob and Eve on AWGN wiretap
channel systems for different values of SNR gaps, SNRg. The random bits Bob send
to Alice have length S = 32. The polar codes employed have a code rate of 0.5, code
length N = 512 and BPSK modulation. The polar codes are constructed by the
heuristic method and SC decoders are applied to recover the information messages.
In Fig. 5.5 we set SNRg = 0, such that the main channel and the wiretap channel
have the same level of noise. The probability that UES 6= US, P ce can be interpreted
as the average number of bit errors in the random sequence UES obtained by Eve. We
72






























Figure 5.5: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel






























Figure 5.6: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel
and wiretap channel are both AWGN channels, where SNRg = −3dB.
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Figure 5.7: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel
and wiretap channel are both AWGN channels, where SNRg = −6dB.
can see when P ce = 1/256, there is only one error in the frozen bits of Eve’s decoder,
however the BER is always higher than 0.13. In addition with P ce increased to 1/32
the BER of Eve approaches 0.5. As for Bob, as the SNR increases, the BER of Bob
approaches zero. This means our proposed scheme can obtain secure and reliable
communication between Alice and Bob. In Fig. 5.6 and 5.7 the SNRgs are -3dB
and -6dB respectively. In these case the wiretap channels are non-degraded. Hence,
when the eavesdropper channel is better than the main channel, our proposed scheme
still works. In [33], all random frozen bits are fed back to Alice, which reduces the
efficiency of this scheme. However, we show that the same level of security can still
be achieved if only a small proportion of the random frozen bits is fed back, which
increases efficiency.
5.5.2 Performance of Proposed Coding Scheme on Wiretap
Systems with SαS Noises
For Figs. 5.8 to 5.13 a polar code with block length N = 512 and code rate 0.5
is constructed using DE. The random bits length from the feedback channel is still
S = 32.
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c =1/256  1.9 1.9
Eve-P
e
c =1/128  1.9 1.99
Eve-P
e
c =1/64  1.9 1.99
Figure 5.8: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel
























c =1/256 1.6 1.9
Eve-P
e
c =1/128 1.6 1.9
Eve-P
e
c =1/64 1.6 1.9
Figure 5.9: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel
(αB = 1.6) is worse than the wiretap channel (αE = 1.9).
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Figure 5.10: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel














































Figure 5.11: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel
(αB = 1.3) is worse than the wiretap channel (αE = 1.6).
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Figure 5.12: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel














































Figure 5.13: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel
is impulsive channel (αB = 1.3) and the wiretap channel is AWGN channel.
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In Fig. 5.8, the polar code is transmitted over a slightly impulsive channel
αB = 1.9, and the eavesdropper channel is better with αE = 1.99. In Fig. 5.9 we
consider a more impulsive noise channel system (αB = 1.6, αE = 1.9). In Fig. 5.10,
the polar code is transmitted over an extremely impulsive channel (αB = αE = 1.3)
on Bob and Eve’s channel. In Fig. 5.11 and Fig. 5.12 we consider the main channel
to be more impulsive than the wiretap channel and in Fig. 5.13 we consider a special
case, in which only the eavesdropper channel is AWGN. This means that in both
figures the main channel is more impulsive than the eavesdropper’s channel.
We observe that the BER of Bob approaches zero with increasing SNR and for all
values of α, but most importantly the BER of Eve is very close to 0.5 with increasing






BER performance of Eve is still close to 0.5. This shows that the proposed joint
polar coded physical layer security scheme using ARQ with selected frozen bits can
achieve excellent security, even when the main channel is more impulsive than the
wiretap channel. Most significantly, this work shows that we have increased the
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Figure 5.14: BER performance of proposed coding scheme, where the main channel
(αB = 1.3) is impulsive than the wiretap channel (αE = 1.9), the length of polar
codes is N = 2048.
Moreover, to prove that our proposed scheme is able to achieve secure and reliable
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communication in polar codes with larger code length and to verify it increase the
secrecy rate to 0.5 which is larger than chapter 4 we give the simulation results in
Fig. 5.14 for a polar code with code length N = 2048 and code rate 0.5 constructed
using DE and transmitted over an impulsive channel (αB = 1.3) from Alice to Bob,
while the wiretap channel is less impulsive with αE = 1.9.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a frozen bit selection scheme for polar codes
combined with physical layer security in the presence of AWGN noise and impulsive
noise. By flipping certain frozen bits we can maximise the BER performance of
the eavesdropper’s channel, ensuring that no information can be obtained from the
communication between the legitimate users. An ARQ scheme is utilized to feedback
random frozen bits from Bob to Alice without errors, which feeds back only a small
proportion of the random frozen bits to Alice, unlike [33] where all random frozen
bits are fed back. This increases the secrecy rate significantly. Simulation results
show that the BER of Eve is always close to 0.5 even if there is only a single bit
error in Eve’s received frozen bits obtained from Bob. However, the BER of Bob
is unaffected even when Bob’s channel is more impulsive than Eve’s channel. This
chapter has shown that our proposed work can ensure excellent security on different
impulsive noise channels, while significantly increasing the secrecy rate so that it
matches the code rates of conventional polar codes.
Here we explain the complexity and practical limitations caused by ARQ. As we
noted, ARQ can obtain a 3dB gain in performance, while complexity doubles with
each retransmission. In real communication, if channel conditions are too poor,
retransmissions cannot guarantee accuracy, which will cause decoding errors. In
order to ensure correctness, random bits need to retransmit several times, so the
delay is too large. In our work, we use ARQ to ensure random information which





Polar Codes on Wiretap Channels
with Impulsive Noise
6.1 Introduction
In chapter four, we have shown the BER performance of DE-constructed and heuris-
tic constructed polar codes on SαS channels for various values of α. We also ex-
amined the construction of polar codes using DE and a heuristic method on the
wiretap channel in the presence of impulsive noise with SαS distributions. These
appear to be the first results evaluating the performance of polar codes combined
with physical layer security when the noise is impulsive. Most importantly, it was
shown that polar codes can still ensure a secure channel between Alice and Bob at
all SNRs, even when the main channel is more impulsive than the eavesdropper’s
channel. However, the secrecy code rate was quite low. Hence, in chapter 5 we
proposed an ARQ-aided polar coding scheme based on changing frozen bits in the
decoding process to increase the secrecy code rate to 0.5 and ensure secure com-
munication at the same time. An ARQ channel is a kind of degraded channel, but
in this work the main channel from Alice to Bob is worse than the eavesdropper
channel between Alice and Eve. A conventional polar code can have any code rate
by adding or deleting the polarized bit channels which used for transmit information
bits, however the code length is limited to a power of two and as a result polar codes
cannot be employed on arbitrary modulation schemes.
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As sated in the literature, punctured polar codes can have any code rate without
the limitation of block length. Thus the main contribution of this chapter is to apply
punctured polar codes to physical layer security in the presence of SαS noise. All of
our previous work was based on BPSK modulation, so in this chapter we will also
examine the performance of polar codes with higher modulations.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows: First, we find the optimal
puncturing patterns by selecting them from the frozen bits channels based on the
observation that the block error probability is mainly determined by the worst bit
channels. In addition, the performance of our proposed puncturing polar codes on
impulsive noise channels with different values of α are investigated and compared
with the method proposed by [1]. Second, we examine the performance of the
proposed polar codes for M-QAM schemes on SαS noise channels. Finally, the
performance and security of these punctured polar codes are evaluated for BPSK
and M-QAM schemes on the wiretap channel with different levels of impulsiveness.
6.2 The Optimal Puncturing Scheme for SαS Noise
Channels
In this section, we propose a puncturing method and show how to select the punc-
turing patterns only from the frozen bits. First, in Fig. 6.1 we show the error
probability value of each bit channel when the polar code length is N = 32 and the
signal to noise ratio is 3dB. Our design scheme is based on the error probability of
sub-channels. In this chapter, we use K to denote the number of the information
bits, N to denote the code length of the conventional polar codes, and L to denote
the code length of the punctured polar codes, where K ≤ L ≤ N . The index set
of the punctured bits is denote by Ap, and |Ap| = N − L denotes the length of the
punctured bits. The code rate R of the punctured codes is R = K/L.
6.2.1 Proposed Puncture Method
In [1], the puncturing scheme for polar codes proposes that the punctured bits are
selected only from the frozen bits and are known to the decoder. Due to the worst
sub-channels having a significant effect on the block error probability, improving
the performance of the worst sub-channels reduces the block error probability, and
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Channel index




















Figure 6.1: Error probability performance of bit channels of polar codes with code
length N = 32 and code rate R = 0.5.
Figure 6.2: The comparison of the error probability of the sub-channels of the
conventional polar codes, the polar codes without the knowledge of the punctured
bits and polar codes with known punctured bits with code lengths L = 896 in
BI-AWGNC with SNR = 3 dB [1].
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shown in Fig. 6.2 [1]. It is clear that the error probability of the punctured codes
with known bits (where the initial value of LLRs are set as infinity) are lower than
those punctured by the the conventional method, especially for bad bit channels.
The simulation shows that the punctured polar codes proposed by [1] outperform
the conventional punctured codes. However, for this method, when designing the
codes, it focuses on selecting the puncturing pattern first and then re-selecting the
information bits. Therefore, we will consider if the information is selected at first
and fixed, then puncturing the codes from the frozen bit channels, will result in
the punctured polar codes still showing good performance. Indeed, it has been
proven that having a fixed information set and then puncturing the coded bits
corresponding to the worst quality bit channels can reduce the bit channel quality
loss at the punctured positions can achieve excellent performance in [92].
Inspired by the works of [1] and [92] we propose a new method to puncture
polar codes. In our method, the information bits channels are fixed and selected at
first, and the punctured bits are selected from the frozen bits channels which have
the worst channel conditions. For the punctured bits we let the decoder have the
knowledge of them.
Our proposed method is explain as follows:
• Use DE to calculate the error probability of each bit channel corresponding to
the reliability of each bit channels, and sort them.
• Select K bit channels with high reliability as information bits and others set
as frozen bits.
• Choose the lowest reliability bit channels as punctured bit channels, which is
obviously among the frozen bits.
• Generate the polar codeword, then puncture the codeword by Ap.
• At the receiver, fill the information of the punctured position by setting the
LLRs of the puncture bits to infinity, which means the punctured bits are
known to both encoder and decoder.
6.2.2 Comparison with Method Proposed in [1]
In order to compare our proposed puncture method with method proposed in [1] (in
this chapter we named it as WRX’s method), we shall first review the implementa-
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tion of the WRX’s scheme:
• For a given code length L, select the initial puncturing pattern be Ap1 =
{L+ 1, L+ 2, · · · , N} .
• Set {L+ 1, L+ 2, · · · , N} to be frozen bits.
• Choose other frozen bits by the density evolution method.
• Generate the codeword bits, then puncture the codeword by Ap.
• At the receiver, fill the information of the punctured position by setting the
LLRs of the puncture bits to infinity.
We will see the difference of the puncture sets of our proposed puncture method
and WRX’s puncture method. As an example, assume a conventional polar code
length N = 32 and final code length L = 28. The puncture set of our proposed
method is {29, 30, 31, 32}, WRX’s puncture set is {8, 16, 24, 32}. Both methods use
density evolution to calculate the bit channels reliability. From Fig. 6.1 we can
see all of our puncture bits are bit channels with largest error probability, while
WRX’s puncture bits include bits channels with good conditions, which will cause
bit channel quality loss. In addition, by puncturing the worst bit channels, the block
error probability will be reduced according to [1]. We will show the performance
of our proposed puncture polar codes on impulsive noise channels with different
modulation schemes in the results section.
6.3 Punctured Polar Codes for Secure Communi-
cation Systems in the Presence of Impulsive
Noise
6.3.1 System Model
Fig. 6.3 is the system model with our proposed punctured polar codes.
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Figure 6.3: Punctured polar coding scheme security system mode.
6.3.2 Secure Coding Scheme
In this subsection we will explain how to achieve secure communication by applying
punctured polar codes. In this system, the information Alice wants to send to Bob
is assigned to the information bit channels of the punctured polar code. Then we
generate the polar codeword with some bits deleted due to the puncturing method.
After BPSK or M-QAM (M = 4, 16, 64) modulation, the codeword is transmitted
to Bob via the main channel with impulsive noise modelled by SαS distributions in
the presence of Eve. In our proposed security coding scheme we use punctured bits
to achieve security.
• Start with a mother polar code with code length N .
• Use density evolution to calculate the error probability of N bit channels which
correspond to the reliability of each bit channels, and sort them.
• Select the K bit channels with high reliability as information bits, others set
as frozen bits.
• Choose the lowest reliability bit channels as puncture bits channels and set
the puncture sets as Ap.
• Generate the polar codeword bits, then puncture the codeword by Ap.
• The polar codeword after puncturing will be modulated by BPSK/MQAM
modulation, then sent to Bob on an impulsive noise channel, while Eve can
intercept the information through the wiretap channel.
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• At Bob’s receiver, fill the information of the punctured position by setting the
LLRs of the puncture bits to infinity.
• At Eve’s receiver, we assume she knows there are some bits that been deleted
but she has no information of the position of the puncture bits, even if she
know the puncture bits are selected from the frozen bits.
6.4 Results and Discussion
In this section, simulation results are presented for the proposed punctured polar
codes on impulsive noise channels with BPSK and MQAM modulations. In addition,
these punctured polar codes are combined with physical layer security in the presence
of SαS noise. The SC decoding algorithm is employed and all the polar codes
employed are constructed using density evolution.
6.4.1 Performance of Punctured Polar Codes for BPSK and
M-QAM Schemes on Impulsive Noise Channels
In Figs. 6.4 to Fig. 6.6, the BER performance of our proposed method along with
method proposed in [1] and BPSK modulation on impulsive noise channels with
different values of α are shown. The corresponding FER is shown in Fig. 6.7 to Fig.
6.9. In Fig. 6.4 the block length of the polar code is N = 512. After puncturing
the final code length is L = 320 and the code rate is R = 0.7. For α = 1.99,
that means the channel is slightly impulsive and we observe that the polar codes
punctured by our proposed method outperforms punctured polar codes proposed
by [1] and achieves a gain of about 0.8 dB at a BER = 10−3. In addition, there is
an interesting result that shows when the channel becomes more impulsive, the gain
is higher, which can be seen from the simulation results of impulsive noise channels
with α = 1.8 and α = 1.5. In Fig. 6.10 and Fig. 6.11 we give the BER performance
for a code rate R = 0.8.
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N = 512      L = 320      K = 224      R = 0.7
, = 1.99 proposed
, = 1.99 WRX
Figure 6.4: The BER performance on SαS impulsive channel(α = 1.99) of punctured















N = 512      L = 320      K = 224      R = 0.7
, = 1.8  proposed
, = 1.8  WRX
Figure 6.5: The BER performance on SαS impulsive channel(α = 1.8) of punctured
polar codes with code length L = 320 and code rate R = 0.7.
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N = 512      L = 320      K = 224      R = 0.7
, = 1.5  proposed
, = 1.5  WRX
Figure 6.6: The BER performance on SαS impulsive channel(α = 1.5) of punctured
polar codes with code length L = 320 and code rate R = 0.7.










N = 512      L = 320      K = 224     R = 0.7
 = 1.99 proposed
 = 1.99 WRX
Figure 6.7: The FER performance on SαS impulsive channel(α = 1.99) of punctured
polar codes with code length L = 320 and code rate R = 0.7.
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N = 512      L = 320      K = 224     R = 0.7
 = 1.8   proposed
 = 1.8   WRX
Figure 6.8: The FER performance on SαS impulsive channel(α = 1.8) of punctured
polar codes with code length L = 320 and code rate R = 0.7.












N = 512      L = 320      K = 224     R = 0.7
 = 1.5   proposed
 = 1.5  WRX
Figure 6.9: The FER performance on SαS impulsive channel(α = 1.5) of punctured
polar codes with code length L = 320 and code rate R = 0.7.
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N = 512      L = 320      K = 256      ,  = 1.99
R = 0.8 proposed
R = 0.8 WRX
Figure 6.10: The BER performance on SαS impulsive channel(α = 1.99) of punc-

















N = 512      L = 320      K = 256      ,  = 1.8
R = 0.8 proposed
R = 0.8 WRX
Figure 6.11: The BER performance on SαS impulsive channel(α = 1.8) of punctured
polar codes with code length L = 320 and code rate R = 0.8.
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In Fig. 6.12, we investigate the BER performance of polar codes with a final
block length L = 320, code rate R = 0.8 with 4, 16 and 64QAM modulations on an
impulsive noise channel (α = 1.9). We can see the punctured polar codes can obtain
any block length suitable for any modulation scheme. Simulation results show our
proposed puncture scheme is better than [1] for 4, 16, and 64QAM.
















Figure 6.12: The BER performance on SαS impulsive channel of punctured polar
codes with code length L = 320 with 4, 16, and 64-QAM modulations.
6.4.2 Secure Performance of Punctured Polar Codes for BPSK
and M-QAM Schemes on the Wiretap Channel Sys-
tems with Impulsive Noise
The results of the security performance of our proposed punctured polar codes on
wiretap channels with BPSK modulation scheme are shown in Figs. 6.13 to Fig.
6.18.
In Fig. 6.13 we employ the punctured polar codes with a final block length
L = 320, code rate R = 0.8. After BPSK modulation, the codeword is transmitted
over an impulsive noise channel with α = 1.9 to Bob and Eve’s channel, which has
the same channel condition. We can observe that the BER performance of Bob is
better than Eve, especially when the SNR is smaller than 8dB. That means security
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can be achieved in a range of SNRs. In Fig. 6.14 the eavesdropper channel from
Alice to Eve is much better(α = 1.99) than the main channel (α = 1.9) between
Alice to bob. From the BER curves we can see that due to the advantage of Eve’s
channel BER is better than Fig 6.13, and the security SNR range is reduces to 7dB.
In Figs. 6.15 to 6.18 we employ the punctured polar codes with final block
length L = 1280 and code rate R = 0.8. After BPSK modulation, in Fig. 6.15
the codeword is transmitted over an impulsive noise channel with αB = 1.1 from
Alice to Bob in the presence of eavesdropper, and the eavesdropper channel has the
same channel condition. We can observe that the BER performance of Bob is better
than Eve. When the SNR is smaller than 20.7dB, the BER of Eve is larger than
0.1. In Fig. 6.16, both the eavesdropper channel from Alice to Eve and the main
channel between Alice to bob are impulsive noise channels with αB = αE = 1.5, the
BER of Eve is larger than 0.1 when SNR is smaller than 12.5 dB. When the channel
is slightly impulsive (αb = αE = 1.9) in Fig. 6.17, secure communication can be
achieve when the SNR is smaller than 7.7dB. We can observe that when both the
main channel and eavesdropper channel are extremely impulsive, the SNR range for
security is larger. In Fig. 6.18, we consider a special situation, where the channel
from Alice to Bob is much more impulsive with αB = 1.5 than the channel between
Alice to Eve with αE = 1.9. Simulation results show Bob still outperforms Eve.
The secure performance of our proposed polar codes on impulsive noise wiretap
channel systems with 4, 16 and 64QAM schemes are shown in Fig. 6.19, Fig. 6.20
and Fig. 6.21. The simulation results indicate that Eve performance is bad over a
range of SNR for 4, 16 and 64QAM.
In Fig. 6.19 to 6.21 we employed the punctured polar codes with final code
length L = 420 and code rate R = 0.6095. After 4QAM modulation, the codeword
is transmitted over an impulsive noise channel with αB = 1.9 from Alice to Bob
and Eve’s channel is under the same channel condition. From Fig. 6.19 we observe
that the when SNR is between 2dB and 8dB, the BER of Eve is larger than 0.1.
For the same codes in Fig. 6.20, when modulated by 16QAM, the punctured polar
coding scheme shows good performance from 5dB to 15.5dB. However, in Fig. 6.21
for 64QAM the SNR range changes from 8.5dB to 15.5dB.
Using the proposed puncturing coding scheme, we can increase the secrecy code
rate with any code block length and extend the polar codes for any modulation.
92
6.4 Results and Discussion











N = 512     L = 320       K = 256
Bob  = 1.9   R = 0.8
Eve   = 1.9   R = 0.8
Figure 6.13: BER performance of punctured polar codes with BPSK modulation on
wiretap channel, where the main channel is same impulsive with the eavesdropper
channel (α = 1.9), where the code length L = 320 and code rate R = 0.8.











N = 512     L = 320       K = 256
Bob  = 1.9   R = 0.8
Eve  = 1.99 R = 0.8
Figure 6.14: BER performance of punctured polar codes with BPSK modulation
on wiretap channel, where the main channel is impulsive with α = 1.9, and the
eavesdropper channel is slightly impulsive with α = 1.99, where the code length
L = 320 and code rate R = 0.8.
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 = 1.1      ,
E
 = 1.1      N = 2048     L = 1280       K = 1024
Bob R = 0.8
Eve R = 0.8
Figure 6.15: BER performance of punctured polar codes with BPSK modulation on
wiretap channel, where the main channel is same impulsive with the eavesdropper



















 = 1.5      ,
E
 = 1.5      N = 2048     L = 1280       K = 1024
Bob R = 0.8
Eve R = 0.8
Figure 6.16: BER performance of punctured polar codes with BPSK modulation on
wiretap channel, where the main channel is same impulsive with the eavesdropper
channel (αB = αE = 1.5), where the code length L = 1280 and code rate R = 0.8.
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 = 1.9     ,
E
 = 1.9      N = 2048     L = 1280       K = 1024
Bob R = 0.8
Eve R = 0.8
Figure 6.17: BER performance of punctured polar codes with BPSK modulation on
wiretap channel, where the main channel is same impulsive with the eavesdropper
channel (αB = αE = 1.9), where the code length L = 1280 and code rate R = 0.8.












B = 1.5     E = 1.9      N = 2048     L = 1280       K = 1024
Bob R = 0.8
Eve  R = 0.8
Figure 6.18: BER performance of punctured polar codes with BPSK modulation
on wiretap channel, where the main channel is impulsive with αB = 1.5, and the
eavesdropper channel is less impulsive with αE = 1.9, where the code length L =
1280 and code rate R = 0.8.
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 = 1.9      ,
E
 = 1.9      N = 512      L = 420      K 256
Bob 4QAM  R = 0.6095 Bob
Eve 4QAM  R = 0.6095 Eve
Figure 6.19: BER performance of punctured polar codes with 4-QAM modulation
on wiretap channel, where the main channel is same impulsive with the eavesdropper


















 = 1.9      ,
E
 = 1.9      N = 512      L = 420      K 256
Bob 16QAM  R = 0.6095
Eve 16QAM  R = 0.6095
Figure 6.20: BER performance of punctured polar codes with 16-QAM modulation
on wiretap channel, where the main channel is same impulsive with the eavesdropper
channel (αB = αE = 1.9), where the code length L = 420 and code rate R = 0.6095.
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B = 1.9      E = 1.9      N = 512      L = 420      K = 256
Bob 64QAM  R = 0.6095
Eve 64QAM  R = 0.6095
Figure 6.21: BER performance of punctured polar codes with 64-QAM modulation
on wiretap channel, where the main channel is same impulsive with the eavesdropper
channel (αB = αE = 1.9), where the code length L = 420 and code rate R = 0.6095.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we first proposed a puncturing method to solve the block length of
polar code being restricted to 2n, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . . This can be obtained by remov-
ing certain bits and shortening the block length so that arbitrary block lengths can
be used. The design method was proposed to puncture a polar code on impulsive
noise channels modelled as a symmetric alpha-stable distribution and compared with
method proposed in [1]. Then we applied the proposed punctured polar codes to
4, 16, and 64-QAM modulation schemes. Simulation results are presented showing
that these rate-compatible polar codes achieve better performance than in [1]. In
addition, we use theses codes to achieve security on the wiretap channel with im-
pulsive noise and different orders of QAM modulation. Simulation results show the
proposed coding scheme can achieve very good security performance over a certain
range of SNRs but not all the SNRs. The reason is that in our secure coding scheme,
we assume Eve has knowledge of that punctured bits selected from the frozen bits
and the length of the punctured bits but has no idea of the exact positions of the
punctured bits. However, if Eve knew nothing of the punctured bits, the BER of
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Eve would be even worse, but this cannot be guaranteed in a real communication
system. Therefore, how to achieve very good security performance over all SNRs is
recommended for future work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Research
7.1 Conclusion
This thesis has investigated the performance and security of polar codes combined
with physical layer security on the wiretap channel system where all users experience
impulsive noise that modeled by SαS distribution. Until now, the effect of impulsive
noise on this type of system had not been considered and it opened up new problems
to solve, such as the design of polar codes combined with physical layer security on
impulsive noise channels and assessing the effect on the security of this system. In
particular, the scenario where the main channel between Alice and Bob was more
impulsive than the unauthorised channel between Alice and Eve was investigated,
which would appear to give Eve an advantage to intercept the communication be-
tween Alice and Bob, due to Eve’s channel being less harsh. However, it was shown
that good polar codes could still be designed to ensure Bob’s BER performance was
very good, but Eve’s BER performance was still poor at all signal-to-noise ratios.
The contributions from chapter four to six are now summarised.
In chapter four, the construction of secure polar codes combined with physi-
cal layer security on impulsive noise channels was presented. A density evolution
method was proposed that used knowledge of the probability density function of
the symmetric alpha-stable noise to construct polar codes that outperformed those
constructed from a heuristic method. The security of the system was also main-
tained, with Bob achieving a very good BER performance while Eve’s performance
was flat at a very high BER over all signal-to-noise ratios and for varying levels of
impulsiveness. However, for a fixed code rate of polar code constructed from this
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method, the secrecy rate is always low due to the small number of available bit
channels for the secure message.
Although the proposed construction of polar codes combined with physical layer
security can make sure a secure system in the present of impulsive noise, even
when the main channel is more impulsive than the wiretap channel, but it has been
observed that there is a trad off of the secrecy code rate. For a fixed code rate of the
conventional polar codes, due to the large number of information bit channels which
are use to transmit to random bits, the left amount of information bit channels for
secure message is quit lower. Hence, we have proposed a coding scheme to increase
the secrecy code rate in Chapter 5.
Chapter five followed on from the work in the previous chapter and addressed
the issue of the inherent low secrecy code rates in the designed polar codes. The
secrecy code rate was increased by removing random bits from the bit channels of
the polar code and transmitting all information bits, so that the secrecy code rate
was equal to the code rate. However, to ensure the security of the scheme, random
bits are introduced into the frozen bits so that Eve does not receive information
about the message and good performance at Bob is achieved by adding an ARQ
feedback channel from Bob to Alice. Due to feeds back only a small proportion of
the random frozen bits to Alice, unlike [33] where all random frozen bits are fed
back, which increases efficiency. Hence, good, secure polar codes with high secrecy
code rates can now be designed, improving the efficiency of the polar-coded physical
layer security system.
Chapter six addresses a major issue affecting the polar codes in both chapters
four and five, where the block length of the polar code is restricted to 2n, where n
is a positive integer. This can be achieved by employing a puncturing scheme to
the polar code to remove certain bits and shorten the code so that numerous block
lengths can be used. A design method was proposed to puncture a polar code on
impulsive noise channels modelled as a symmetric alpha-stable distribution. Lifting
the restriction on the block length means that it now simpler to map the coded
bits to other modulation schemes, such as 4, 16, and 64-QAM. Simulation results
are presented showing that these rate-compatible polar codes achieve very good
performance and security on the wiretap channel with impulsive noise and different
order of QAM modulation.
In conclusion, new polar codes have been designed and constructed that offer
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very good security when combined with physical layer security. The design methods
described in the thesis allow significant flexibility in several coding parameters, such
as secrecy rate, code rate and block length, so that a secure polar code can be
designed to satisfy the requirements of any communication system in impulsive
environments.
7.2 Future Research
The thesis has focused on the design of polar codes combined with physical layer
security on impulsive noise channels. However, this could be extended to different
channels, such as fading channels. Due to the severe fading effects, error correc-
tion is not sufficient to correct errors and additional signal processing techniques to
mitigate the fading effects are needed, such as channel equalisation or Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM). Therefore, there is scope for new receiver
designs that incorporate error-correcting codes, physical layer security and equal-
isation/OFDM to produce a high performance and high security communication
scheme on wireless fading channels.
With the development of 5G communications, it is clear that massive multiple-
input-multiple-output (MIMO) technology will play a significant role in achieving
very high data rates. The security of 5G communications is also as important and
there is scope to extend the work presented in this thesis to massive MIMO systems.
There are some simplifications to the methods proposed in this thesis that could
also be investigated. The density evolution method to construct polar codes for
impulsive noise channels has a high complexity due to the symmetric alpha-stable
distributions used to model the noise. The probability density functions of these
distribution are complicated, but they are well known to accurately model impulsive
noise in a wireless communication channel. It would be interesting to approximate
the symmetric alpha-stable distributions with a simpler probability density function
equation, such as the Gaussian-Cauchy mixture model, and evaluate the trade-off
between the performance, security and complexity.
Finally, to improve the performance of the polar-coded physical layer security
system, the design of non-binary polar codes could be investigated. This is an
extremely niche area with few papers in the literature. However, it is well-known
that non-binary codes can outperform binary codes, particularly on channel where
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burst errors occur, and they could enhance the performance and may be even the
security of the polar-coded physical layer security system on harsh channels.
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[34] E. Şaşoğlu and A. Vardy, “A new polar coding scheme for strong security on
wiretap channels,” in 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Information The-
ory. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1117–1121.
[35] J. M. Renes, R. Renner, and D. Sutter, “Efficient one-way secret-key agreement
and private channel coding via polarization,” in International Conference on
the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Springer,
2013, pp. 194–213.
[36] R. A. Chou, M. R. Bloch, and E. Abbe, “Polar coding for secret-key genera-
tion,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 61, no. 11, pp. 6213–
6237, 2015.
[37] Y.-P. Wei and S. Ulukus, “Polar coding for the general wiretap channel,” in
2015 IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW). IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–5.
[38] R. A. Chou and M. R. Bloch, “Polar coding for the broadcast channel with
confidential messages: A random binning analogy,” IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Theory, vol. 62, no. 5, pp. 2410–2429, 2016.
[39] T. C. Gulcu and A. Barg, “Achieving secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel
and broadcast channel with a confidential component,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 1311–1324, 2016.
[40] M. Zheng, M. Tao, and W. Chen, “Polar coding for secure transmission in miso
fading wiretap channels,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1411.2463, 2014.
[41] O. O. Koyluoglu and H. El Gamal, “Polar coding for secure transmission and
key agreement,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 1472–1483, 2012.
[42] M. Andersson, V. Rathi, R. Thobaben, J. Kliewer, and M. Skoglund, “Nested
polar codes for wiretap and relay channels,” IEEE Communications Letters,
vol. 14, no. 8, pp. 752–754, 2010.
106
REFERENCES
[43] H. Si, O. O. Koyluoglu, and S. Vishwanath, “Achieving secrecy without any
instantaneous csi: Polar coding for fading wiretap channels,” in 2015 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). IEEE, 2015, pp.
2161–2165.
[44] W. Hao, L. Yin, and Q. Huang, “Secrecy transmission scheme based on 2-
d polar coding over block fading wiretap channels,” IEEE Communications
Letters, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 882–885, 2018.
[45] J. Ha, J. Kim, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Rate-compatible puncturing of low-
density parity-check codes,” IEEE Transactions on information Theory, vol. 50,
no. 11, pp. 2824–2836, 2004.
[46] J. Ha, J. Kim, D. Klinc, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Rate-compatible punctured
low-density parity-check codes with short block lengths,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 728–738, 2006.
[47] H. Pishro-Nik and F. Fekri, “Results on punctured low-density parity-check
codes and improved iterative decoding techniques,” IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Theory, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 599–614, 2007.
[48] A. Eslami and H. Pishro-Nik, “A practical approach to polar codes,” in 2011
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory Proceedings. IEEE,
2011, pp. 16–20.
[49] K. Niu, K. Chen, and J.-R. Lin, “Beyond turbo codes: Rate-compatible punc-
tured polar codes,” in 2013 IEEE International Conference on Communications
(ICC). IEEE, 2013, pp. 3423–3427.
[50] D.-M. Shin, S.-C. Lim, and K. Yang, “Design of length-compatible polar codes
based on the reduction of polarizing matrices,” IEEE Transactions on Commu-
nications, vol. 61, no. 7, pp. 2593–2599, 2013.
[51] L. Zhang, Z. Zhang, X. Wang, Q. Yu, and Y. Chen, “On the puncturing pat-
terns for punctured polar codes,” in 2014 IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory. IEEE, 2014, pp. 121–125.
107
REFERENCES
[52] H. Saber and I. Marsland, “An incremental redundancy hybrid arq scheme via
puncturing and extending of polar codes,” IEEE Transactions on Communica-
tions, vol. 63, no. 11, pp. 3964–3973, 2015.
[53] V. Miloslavskaya, “Shortened polar codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 61, no. 9, pp. 4852–4865, 2015.
[54] V. Bioglio, F. Gabry, and I. Land, “Low-complexity puncturing and shorten-
ing of polar codes,” in 2017 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking
Conference Workshops (WCNCW). IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[55] Q. Kai, Z. Sheng-mei, and S. Peng, “Design of the gaussian wiretap channel
with punctured polar codes.” Journal of Signal Processing, vol. 30, no. 11, 2014.
[56] P. Cardieri, “Modeling interference in wireless ad hoc networks,” IEEE Com-
munications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 551–572, 2010.
[57] P. C. Pinto and M. Z. Win, “Communication in a poisson field of interferers-
part ii: Channel capacity and interference spectrum,” IEEE Transactions on
Wireless Communications, vol. 9, no. 7, pp. 2187–2195, 2010.
[58] B. Nikfar, T. Akbudak, and A. H. Vinck, “Mimo capacity of class a impulsive
noise channel for different levels of information availability at transmitter,” in
18th IEEE International Symposium on Power Line Communications and Its
Applications. IEEE, 2014, pp. 266–271.
[59] D. Zha and T. Qiu, “Underwater sources location in non-gaussian impulsive
noise environments,” Digital Signal Processing, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 149–163,
2006.
[60] N. Farsad, W. Guo, C.-B. Chae, and A. Eckford, “Stable distributions as noise
models for molecular communication,” in 2015 IEEE Global Communications
Conference (GLOBECOM). IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[61] M. Zimmermann and K. Dostert, “Analysis and modeling of impulsive noise in
broad-band powerline communications,” IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.,
vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 249–258, 2002.
108
REFERENCES
[62] B. Hu and N. C. Beaulieu, “On characterizing multiple access interference in
TH-UWB systems with impulsive noise models,” in 2008 IEEE Radio and Wire-
less Symposium, 2008.
[63] D. Middleton, “Non-Gaussian noise models in signal processing for telecommu-
nications: new methods an results for class a and class b noise models,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 1129–1149, 1999.
[64] T. Shongwey, A. H. Vinck, and H. C. Ferreira, “On impulse noise and its
models,” in 2014 18th IEEE International Symposium on Power Line Commu-
nications and its Applications (ISPLC). IEEE, 2014, pp. 12–17.
[65] M. Shao and C. L. Nikias, “Signal processing with fractional lower order
moments: stable processes and their applications,” Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 81, no. 7, pp. 986–1010, 1993.
[66] H. Nakagawa, D. Umehara, S. Denno, and Y. Morihiro, “A decoding for low
density parity check codes over impulsive noise channels,” in International Sym-
posium on Power Line Communications and Its Applications, 2005. IEEE,
2005, pp. 85–89.
[67] N. Andreadou and F.-N. Pavlidou, “Mitigation of impulsive noise effect on the
plc channel with qc–ldpc codes as the outer coding scheme,” IEEE Transactions
on Power Delivery, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 1440–1449, 2010.
[68] Z. Mei, M. Johnston, S. Le Goff, and L. Chen, “Density evolution analysis
of LDPC codes with different receivers on impulsive noise channels,” in 2015
IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC).
IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[69] ——, “Error probability analysis of m-qam on rayleigh fading channels with
impulsive noise,” in 2016 IEEE 17th International Workshop on Signal Pro-
cessing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC). IEEE, 2016, pp.
1–5.
[70] ——, “Finite length analysis of low-density parity-check codes on impulsive
noise channels,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 9635–9642, 2016.
109
REFERENCES
[71] ——, “Performance analysis of ldpc-coded diversity combining on rayleigh fad-
ing channels with impulsive noise,” IEEE Transactions on Communications,
vol. 65, no. 6, pp. 2345–2356, 2017.
[72] D. Umehara, H. Yamaguchi, and Y. Morihiro, “Turbo decoding in impulsive
noise environment,” in IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2004.
GLOBECOM’04., vol. 1. IEEE, 2004, pp. 194–198.
[73] W. Abd-Alaziz, M. Johnston, and S. Le Goff, “Non-binary turbo codes on
additive impulsive noise channels,” in 2016 10th International Symposium on
Communication Systems, Networks and Digital Signal Processing (CSNDSP).
IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–5.
[74] W. Abd-Alaziz, Z. Mei, M. Johnston, and S. Le Goff, “Non-binary turbo-coded
ofdm-plc system in the presence of impulsive noise,” in 2017 25th European
Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO). IEEE, 2017, pp. 2576–2580.
[75] J. Jin, H.-M. Oh, S. Choi, J. Seo, and J.-J. Lee, “Performance of polar codes
with successive cancellation decoding over plc channels,” in 2015 IEEE In-
ternational Symposium on Power Line Communications and Its Applications
(ISPLC). IEEE, 2015, pp. 24–28.
[76] A. Hadi, K. M. Rabie, and E. Alsusa, “Polar codes based ofdm-plc systems
in the presence of middleton class-a noise,” in 2016 10th International Sym-
posium on Communication Systems, Networks and Digital Signal Processing
(CSNDSP). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–6.
[77] Z. Mei, B. Dai, M. Johnston, and R. Carrasco, “Design of polar codes with
single and multi-carrier modulation on impulsive noise channels using density
evolution,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.00983, 2017.
[78] M. Chitre, J. Potter, and O. S. Heng, “Underwater acoustic channel charac-
terisation for medium-range shallow water communications,” in OCEANS’04.
MTTS/IEEE TECHNO-OCEAN’04, vol. 1. IEEE, 2004, pp. 40–45.
[79] G. Laguna-Sanchez and M. Lopez-Guerrero, “On the use of alpha-stable distri-




[80] J. G. Gonzalez, J. L. Paredes, and G. R. Arce, “Zero-order statistics: a math-
ematical framework for the processing and characterization of very impulsive
signals,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 54, no. 10, pp. 3839–
3851, 2006.
[81] G. Samoradnitsky and M. S. Taqqu, Stable non-Gaussian random processes:
stochastic models with infinite variance. Chapman and Hall/CRC, 1994.
[82] T. Richardson and R. Urbanke, Modern coding theory. Cambridge university
press, 2008.
[83] A. Balatsoukas-Stimming, M. B. Parizi, and A. Burg, “Llr-based successive can-
cellation list decoding of polar codes,” IEEE transactions on signal processing,
vol. 63, no. 19, pp. 5165–5179, 2015.
[84] G. A. Tsihrintzis and C. L. Nikias, “Performance of optimum and suboptimum
receivers in the presence of impulsive noise modeled as an alpha-stable process,”
IEEE Transactions on communications, vol. 43, no. 234, pp. 904–914, 1995.
[85] S. Lin, D. J. Costello, and M. J. Miller, “Automatic-repeat-request error-control
schemes,” IEEE Communications magazine, vol. 22, no. 12, pp. 5–17, 1984.
[86] B. Zhao and M. C. Valenti, “Practical relay networks: a generalization of
hybrid-arq,” IEEE Journal on selected areas in communications, vol. 23, no. 1,
pp. 7–18, 2005.
[87] Y. Yan, B. Zhang, D. Guo, S. Li, H. Niu, and X. Wang, “Joint beamforming
and jamming design for secure cooperative hybrid satellite-terrestrial relay net-
work,” in 2016 25th Wireless and Optical Communication Conference (WOCC).
IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–5.
[88] P.-H. Lin, S.-H. Lai, S.-C. Lin, and H.-J. Su, “On secrecy rate of the general-
ized artificial-noise assisted secure beamforming for wiretap channels,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1202.5830, 2012.
[89] H. Cao, Z. Mei, M. Johnston, and S. Le Goff, “Construction of polar codes
combined with physical layer security on impulsive noise channels,” in 2018
IEEE 18th International Conference on Communication Technology (ICCT).
IEEE, 2018, pp. 181–185.
111
REFERENCES
[90] E. Arikan and E. Telatar, “On the rate of channel polarization,” in 2009 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory. IEEE, 2009, pp. 1493–1495.
[91] Y. Zhang, A. Liu, K. Pan, C. Gong, and S. Yang, “A practical construction
method for polar codes,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 18, no. 11, pp.
1871–1874, 2014.
[92] L. Li, W. Song, and K. Niu, “Optimal puncturing of polar codes with a fixed
information set,” IEEE Access, 2019.
112
